CHAP. III.] THE MIND THAT LOVES ITSELF, KNOWS ITSELF. 247
Is it itself ? But how can this be when it does not yet know
itself, and no one can love what he does not know ? Is it
that report has declared to it its own species, in like way as
we commonly hear of people who are absent ? Perhaps, then,
it does not love itself, but loves that which it imagines of
itself, which is perhaps widely different from what itself is
:
or if the phantasy in the mind is like the mind itself, and so
when it loves this fancied image, it loves itself before it knew
itself, because it gazes upon that which is like itself; then
it knew . other minds from which to picture itself, and so
is known to itself generically. Why, then, when it knows
other minds, does it not know itself, since nothing can possibly
be more present to it than itself ? But if, as other eyes are
more known to the eyes of the body, than those eyes are to
themselves ; then let it not seek itself, because it never will
find itself. For eyes can never see themselves except in look-
ing-glasses ; and it cannot be supposed in any way that any-
thing of that kind can be applied also to the contemplation of
incorporeal things, so that the mind should know itself, as it
were, in a looking-glass. Or does it see in the reason of
eternal truth how beautiful it is to know one's self, and so
loves this which it sees, and studies to bring it to pass in it-
self ? because, although it is not known to itself, yet it is
known to it how good it is, that it should be known to itself.
And this, indeed, is very wonderful, that it does not yet know
itself, and yet knows already how excellent a thing it is to
know itself. Or does it see some most excellent end, viz. its
own serenity and blessedness, by some hidden remembrance,
which has not abandoned it, although it has gone far onwards,
and believes that it cannot attain to that same end unless it
know itself ? And so while it loves that, it seeks this ; and
loves that which is known, on account of which it seeks that
which is unknown. But why should the remembrance of its
own blessedness be able to last, and the remembrance of itself
not be able to last as well ; that so it should know itself which
wishes to attain, as well as know that to which it wishes
to attain ? Or when it loves to know itself, does it love, not
itself, which it does not yet know, but the very act of know-
ing ; and feel the more annoyed that itself is wanting to its