have to part with servants to whom he was attached,” &c. To my mind, it is impossible to
believe that Diocletian—great and wise emperor as he had proved himself, and with an ex-
perience of over eighteen years of imperial power during which he had always shown himself
master—can thus have yielded simply to the importunity of another man. Our knowledge
of Diocletian’s character should lead us to repudiate absolutely such a supposition. Feeling
the difficulty of his own supposition, Mason suggests that Diocletian may have felt that it
would be better for him to begin the persecution himself, and thus hold it within some
bounds, than to leave it for Galerius to conduct when he should become emperor two years
later. But certainly if, as Mason assumes, Diocletian was convinced that the measure was in
itself vicious and impolitic, that was a most remarkable course to pursue. To do a bad thing
in order to leave no excuse for a successor to do the same thing in a worse way—certainly
that is hardly what we should expect from the strongest and the wisest ruler Rome had seen
for three centuries. If he believed it ought not to be done, we may be sure he would not have
done it, and that neither Galerius nor any one else could compel him to. He was not such
a helpless tool in the hands of others, nor was he so devoid of resources as to be obliged to
prevent a successor’s folly and wickedness by anticipating him in it, nor so devoid of sense
as to believe that he could. It is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary to assume that Diocletian
was convinced of the necessity of proceeding against the Christians before he took the step
he did. How then are we to account for this change in his opinions? Burckhardt attributes
the change to the discovery of a plot among the Christians. But the question naturally arises,
what motive can the Christians have had for forming a plot against an emperor so friendly
to them and a government under which they enjoyed such high honors? Burckhardt gives
no satisfactory answer to this very pertinent query, and consequently his theory has not
found wide acceptance. And yet I believe he is upon the right track in speaking of a plot,
though he has not formed the right conception of its causes and nature, and has not been
able to urge any known facts in direct support of his theory. In my opinion the key to the
mystery lies in the fact which Lactantius states and the truth of which Mason demonstrates,
but which Burckhardt quite overlooks, that the initiative came from Galerius, not Diocletian,
viewed in the light of the facts that Galerius had long been known to be a bitter enemy of
the Christians, and that he was to succeed Diocletian within a couple of years. The course
of events might be pictured somewhat as follows. Some of the Christian officials and retainers
of Diocletian, fearing what might happen upon the accession of Galerius, who was known
to be a deadly enemy of the Christians, and who might be expected, if not to persecute, at
least to be a deadly enemy of the Christian officials that had enjoyed Diocletian’s favor
(Galerius himself had only heathen officials in his court), conceived the idea of frustrating
1020
On Bk. VIII. chap. 2, § 4 (note 3, continued). The Causes of the Diocletian…