And this may be perceived throughout the whole of creation, but in the case of the holy and superessential and incomprehensible Trinity, far removed from everything, it is quite the reverse. For there the community and unity are observed in fact, through the co-eternity of the subsistences, and through their having the same essence and energy and will and concord of mind τὴν τῆς γνώμης σύμπνοιαν; co-operation of judgment, or, disposition., and then being identical in authority and power and goodness—I do not say similar but identical—and then movement by one impulse Greg. Naz., Orat. 40. The Greek is singular and difficult: τὸ ἕν ἔξαλμα τῆς κινήσεως; the one forthleaping of the motion, or movement. Origen speaks of ἡ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ κίνησις (I. 436 A.). In Athanasius (I. 253 C.) κίνησις has the metaphorical sense of indignation.. For there is one essence, one goodness, one power, one will, one energy, one authority, one and the same, I repeat, not three resembling each other. But the three subsistences have one and the same movement. For each one of them is related as closely to the other as to itself: that is to say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one in all respects, save those of not being begotten, of birth and of procession. But it is by thought that the difference is perceived Greg. Naz., Orat. 37; Greg. Nyss., Epist. ad Ablab. et Orat. 32.. For we recognise one God: but only in the attributes of Fatherhood, Sonship, and Procession, both in respect of cause and effect and perfection of subsistence, that is, manner of existence, do we perceive difference Basil., Epist. 43.. For with reference to the uncircumscribed Deity we cannot speak of separation in space, as we can in our own case. For the subsistences dwell in one another, in no wise confused but cleaving together, according to the word of the Lord, I am in the father, and the father in Me St. John xiv. 11.: nor can one admit difference in will or judgment or energy or power or anything else whatsoever which may produce actual and absolute separation in our case. Wherefore we do not speak of three Gods, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but rather of one God, the holy Trinity, the Son and Spirit being referred to one cause εἰς ἓν αἴτιον. So elsewhere it is put, ὥσπερ μία ἀρχή, κατὰ τοῦτο εἷς Θεός. The three Persons or Subsistences are yet One God, because of the one Principle of Being whence Son and spirit derive. So the Father is said to be the ἕνωσις ἐξ οὗ καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἄναγεται τὰ ἑξῆς., and not compounded or coalesced according to the synæresis of Sabellius. For, as we said, they are made one not so as to commingle, but so as to cleave to each other, and they have their being in each other The Greek runs thus:—καὶ τὴν ἐν ἀλλήλαις περιχώρησιν ἔχουσι δίχα πάσης συναλοιφῆς καὶ συμφύρσεως. The term περιχώρησις, circumincessio, immanentia, was meant to express the peculiarity of the relations of the Three Divine Persons or Subsistences—their Indwelling in each other, the fact that, while they are distinct they yet are in one another, the Coinherence which implies their equal and identical Godhead. “In the Trinity,” says Bishop Bull (Defence of the Nicene Creed, bk. iv. ch. iv., secs. 13, 14), “the circumincession is most proper and perfect, forasmuch as the Persons mutually contain Each Other, and all the three have an immeasureable whereabouts (immensum ubi, as the Schoolmen express it), so that wherever one Person is there the other two exist; in other words They are all everywhere.…This outcome of the circumincession of the Persons in the Trinity is so far from introducing Sabellianism, that it is of great use, as Petavius has also observed, for (establishing) the diversity of the Persons, and for confuting that heresy. For, in order to that mutual existence (in each other) which is discerned in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, it is absolutely necessary that there should be some distinction between these who are thus joined together—that is, that those that exist mutually in each other should be different in reality, and not in mode of conception only; for that which is simply one is not said to exist in itself, or to interpenetrate itself.…Lastly, this is to be especially considered—that this circumincession of the Divine Persons is indeed a very great mystery, which we ought rather religiously to adore than curiously to pry into. No similitude can be devised which shall be in every respect apt to illustrate it; no language avails worthily to set it forth, seeing that it is an union which far transcends all other unions.” without any coalescence or commingling. Nor do the Son and the Spirit stand apart, nor are they sundered in essence according to the diæresis of Arias Greg., Orat. 29; Dionys., De div. nom., c. 2.. For the Deity is undivided amongst things divided, to put it concisely: and it is just like three suns cleaving to each other without separation and giving out light mingled and conjoined into one. When, then, we turn our eyes to the Divinity, and the first cause and the sovereignty and the oneness and sameness, so to speak, of the movement and will of the Divinity, and the identity in essence and power and energy and lordship, what is seen by us is unity Greg. Naz., Orat. 37.. But when we look to those things in which the Divinity is, or, to put it more accurately, which are the Divinity, and those things which are in it through the first cause without time or distinction in glory or separation, that is to say, the subsistences of the Son and the Spirit, it seems to us a Trinity that we adore Greg. Naz., Orat. 19 and 29.. The Father is one Father, and without beginning, that is, without cause: for He is not derived from anything. The Son is one Son, but not without beginning, that is, not without cause: for He is derived from the Father. But if you eliminate the idea of a beginning from time, He is also without beginning: for the creator of times cannot be subject to time. The Holy Spirit is one Spirit, going forth from the Father, not in the manner of Sonship but of procession; so that neither has the Father lost His property of being unbegotten because He hath begotten, nor has the Son lost His property of being begotten because He was begotten of that which was unbegotten (for how could that be so?), nor does the Spirit change either into the Father or into the Son because He hath proceeded and is God. For a property is quite constant. For how could a property persist if it were variable, moveable, and could change into something else? For if the Father is the Son, He is not strictly the Father: for there is strictly one Father. And if the Son is the Father, He is not strictly the Son: for there is strictly one Son and one Holy Spirit.