S. Gregory’s reply to the
difficulty may be found in the letter, or short dissertation, addressed
to Ablabius (Quod non sunt tres Dei), and in his treatise
περὶ
κοινῶν
ἐννοίων.
In the latter he lays it down that the term θεός is a
term οὐσίας
σημαντικόν, not a term προσώπων
δηλωτικόν: the Godhead of the Father is not that in which He
maintains His differentiation from the Son: the Son is not God because
He is Son, but because His essential Nature is what it is.
Accordingly, when we speak of “God the Father, God the Son, and
God the Holy Ghost,” the word and is employed to conjoin
the terms expressive of the Persons, not the repeated term which is
expressive of the Essence, and which therefore, while applied to each
of the Three Persons, yet cannot properly be employed in the plural.
That in the case of three individual “men” the term
expressive of essence is employed in the plural is due, he says,
to the fact that in this case there are circumstances which excuse or
constrain such a use of the term “man” while such
circumstances do not affect the case of the Holy Trinity. The
individuals included under the term “man” vary alike in
number and in identity, and thus we are constrained to speak of
“men” as more or fewer, and in a certain sense to treat the
essence as well as the persons numerically. In the Holy Trinity, on the
other hand, the Persons are always the same, and their number the same.
Nor are the Persons of the Holy Trinity differentiated, like individual
men, by relations of time and place, and the like; the differentiation
between them is based upon a constant causal relation existing among
the Three Persons, which does not affect the unity of the Nature: it
does not express the Being, but the mode of Being This
statement strikes at the root of the theory held by Eunomius, as well
as by the earlier Arians, that the ἀγεννησία of the Father constituted His Essence. S. Gregory treats
His ἀγεννησία
as that by which He is distinguished from the other
Persons, as an attribute marking His hypostasis. This subject is
treated more fully, with special reference to the Eunomian view, in the
Ref. alt. libri Eunomii.. The Father is the Cause; the Son and the Holy
Spirit are differentiated from Him as being from the Cause, and again
differentiated inter se as being immediately from the Cause, and
immediately through that which is from the Cause. Further, while these
reasons may be alleged for holding that the cases are not in such a
sense parallel as to allow that the same conclusion as to modes of
speech should be drawn in both, he urges that the use of the term
“men” in the plural is, strictly speaking, erroneous. We
should, in strictness, speak not of “this or that man,” but
of “this or that hypostasis of man”—the “three
men” should be described as “three hypostases” of the
common οὐσία “man.” In the treatise addressed to Ablabius he goes
over the same ground, clothing his arguments in a somewhat less
philosophical dress; but he devotes more space to an examination of the
meaning of the term θεός, with a view to
showing that it is a term expressive of operation, and thereby of
essence, not a term which may be considered as applicable to any
one of the Divine Persons in any such peculiar sense that it may not
equally be applied also to the other two S.
Gregory would apparently extend this argument even to the operations
expressed by the names of “Redeemer,” or
“Comforter;” though he would admit that in regard of the
mode by which these operations are applied to man, the names expressive
of them are used in a special sense of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,
yet he would argue that in neither case does the one Person act without
the other two.. His
argument is partly based upon an etymology now discredited, but this
does not affect the position he seeks to establish (a position which is
also adopted in the treatise, De S. Trinitate), that names
expressive of the Divine Nature, or of the Divine operation (by which
alone that Nature is known to us) are employed, and ought to be
employed, only in the singular. The unity and inseparability of all
Divine operation, proceeding from the Father, advancing through the
Son, and culminating in the Holy Spirit, yet setting forth one
κίνησις of the Divine will, is the reason why the idea of plurality is not
suffered to attach to these names See
Dorner, ut sup., pp. 317–18., while the reason for
refusing to allow, in regard to the three Divine Persons, the same
laxity of language which we tolerate in regard to the case of the three
“men,” is to be found in the fact that in the latter case
no danger arises from the current abuse of language: no one thinks of
“three human natures;” but on the other hand polytheism is
a very real and serious danger, to which the parallel abuse of language
involved in speaking of “three Gods” would infallibly
expose us.