relations. But the Son is properly related to the Father, and that which is begotten to him
that begat it, while the “product of making” has its relation to its “maker”; save if one might
consider some inexact use, in some undistinguishing way of common parlance, to overrule
the strict signification.
By what reasoning then is it, and by what arguments, according to that invincible logic
of his, that he wins back the opinion of the mass of men, and follows out at his pleasure this
line of thought, that as the God Who is over all is conceived and spoken of both as “Creator”
and as “Father,” the Son has a close connection with both titles, being equally called both
“product of creation” and “product of generation”? For as customary accuracy of speech
distinguishes between names of this kind, and applies the name of “generation” in the case
of things generated from the essence itself, and understands that of “creation” of those things
which are external to the nature of their maker, and as on this account the Divine doctrines,
in handing down the knowledge of God, have delivered to us the names of “Father” and
“Son,” not those of “Creator” and “work,” that there might arise no error tending to blas-
phemy (as might happen if an appellation of the latter kind repelled the Son to the position
of an alien and a stranger), and that the impious doctrines which sever the Only-begotten
from essential affinity with the Father might find no entrance—seeing all this, I say, he who
declares that the appellation of “product of making” is one befitting the Son, will safely say
by consequence that the name of “Son” is properly applicable to that which is the product
of making; so that, if the Son is a “product of making,” the heaven is called “Son,” and the
individual things that have been made are, according to our author, properly named by the
appellation of “Son.” For if He has this name, not because He shares in nature with Him
that begat Him, but is called Son for this reason, that He is created, the same argument will
permit that a lamb, a dog, a frog, and all things that exist by the will of their maker, should
be named by the title of “Son.” If, on the other hand, each of these is not a Son and is not
called God, by reason of its being external to the nature of the Son, it follows, surely, that
He Who is truly Son is Son, and is confessed to be God by reason of His being of the very
nature of Him that begat Him. But Eunomius abhors the idea of generation, and excludes
it from the Divine doctrine, slandering the term by his fleshly speculations. Well, our dis-
course, in what precedes, showed sufficiently on this point that, as the Psalmist says, “they
are afraid where no fear is653.” For if it was shown in the case of men that not all generation
exists by way of passion, but that that which is material is by passion, while that which is
spiritual is pure and incorruptible, (for that which is begotten of the Spirit is spirit and not
flesh, and in spirit we see no condition that is subject to passion,) since our author thought
it necessary to estimate the Divine power by means of examples among ourselves, let him
persuade himself to conceive from the other mode of generation the passionless character
653 Cf. Ps. liii. 6
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He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,”…