tion on the examples familiarly known to us. For the thing generated is not to be likened
there to the kind or the manner of its birth. Birth consists, in the case of animal birth, in a
separation of body from body, in which the animal perfectly moulded in the womb is brought
forth; but the thing born is a man, or horse, or cow, or whatever it may chance to be in its
existence through birth. How, therefore, the “manner of the likeness of the offspring follows
the manner of its generation” must be left to him, or to some pupil of his in midwifery, to
explain. Birth is one thing: the thing born is another: they are different ideas altogether. No
one with any sense would deny that what he says is perfectly untrue in the case of animal
births. But if he calls the actual making and the actual fashioning a “manner of the genera-
tion,” which the “manner of the likeness” of the thing produced is to “follow,” even so his
statement is removed from all likelihood, as we shall see from some illustrations. Iron is
hammered out by the blows of the artificer into some useful instrument. How, then, the
outline of its edge, if such there happen to be, can be said to be similar to the hand of the
worker, or to the manner of its fashioning, to the hammers, for instance, and the coals and
the bellows and the anvil by means of which he has moulded it, no one could explain. And
what can be said in one case fits all, where there is any operation producing a result; the
thing produced cannot be said to be like the “manner of its generation.” What has the shape
of a garment got to do with the spool, or the rods, or the comb, or with the form of the
weaver’s instruments at all? What has an actual seat got to do with the working of the blocks;
or any finished production with the build of him who achieved it?—But I think even our
opponents would allow that this rule of his is not in force in sensible and material instances.
It remains to see whether it contributes anything further to the proof of his blasphemy.
What, then, was he aiming at? The necessity of believing in accordance with their being in
the likeness or unlikeness of the Son to the Father; and, as we cannot know about this being
from considerations of Providence, the necessity of having recourse to the “manner of the
generation,” whereby we may know, not indeed whether the Begotten is like the Begetter
(absolutely), but only a certain “manner of likeness” between them; and as this manner is
a secret to the many, the necessity of going at some length into the being of the Begetter.
Then has he forgotten his own definitions about the beings having to be known from their
works? But this begotten being, which he calls the work of the supreme being, has as yet no
light thrown upon it (according to him); so how can its nature be dealt with? And how can
he “mount above this lower and therefore more directly comprehensible thing,” and so cling
to the absolute and supreme being? Again, he always throughout his discourse lays claim
to an accurate knowledge of the divine utterances; yet here he pays them scant reverence,
ignoring the fact that it is not possible to approach to a knowledge of the Father except
through the Son. “No man knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the
Son shall reveal Him166.” Yet Eunomius, while on every occasion, where he can insult our
166 Matt. xi. 27.
147
His dictum that 'the manner of the likeness must follow the manner of the…