Augustine replied to his correspondents by writing
what proved to be almost his latest works,—the treatises
“De Prædestinatione Sanctorum” and “De dono
Perseverantiæ.” In these volumes Augustine, while freely
acknowledging the great difference between his opponents and the
Pelagians, yet maintained as strongly as ever his own position, and
“did not abate an iota of the contention that election and
rejection were arbitrary, and that salvation was not really within the
reach of all Christians.” Bright’s
Anti-Pelagian Treatises, l. c. Thus the books
naturally failed to satisfy the recalcitrant party, or to convince
those who thought that the denial of the freedom of the will tended to
destroy man’s responsibility. Prosper, however, was delighted
with the treatises, and proceeded to follow them up with a work of his
own, a poem of a thousand lines,
“De Ingratis,” by which he
designates the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, whose opinions he speaks
of as spreading with alarming rapidity. The date of this publication
was probably the early part of 430. It was certainly written before the
death of Augustine, which took place on August 28 of the same year. The
removal from this life of the great champion of Grace did not bring to
an end the controversy to which his writings had given birth. The
school of Marseilles continued to propagate its views with unabated
vigour, in spite of the protests of Prosper and Hilary, who finally
took the important step of appealing to Pope Celestine, from whom they
succeeded in obtaining a letter addressed to the Gallican Bishops,
Venerius of Marseilles, Leontius of Fréjus, Marinus, Auxonius,
Arcadius, Filtanius, and the rest. The letter is given in
full in Gazet’s edition of Cassian, with certain doctrinal
articles appended, which really belong to a later date. See Dr.
Newman’s note to the English translation of Fleury, Book XXVI. c.
xi. Celestine
speaks strongly of their negligence in not having suppressed what he
regarded as a public scandal, and says that “priests ought not to
teach so as to invade the episcopal prerogative,” an expression
in which we may well see an allusion to Cassian, the leading presbyter,
of the diocese of Marseilles, whose Bishop is named first in the
opening salutation; and the letter concludes with some words of
eulogium on Augustine “of holy memory.” Never, perhaps, was
Gallican independence shown in a more striking manner than in the
sturdy way in which the Massilians clung to their views in spite of the
authority of the Pope now brought to bear upon them. Prosper and Hilary
on their return found the obnoxious teaching daily spreading, so that
the former of them finally determined to put down, if possible, the
upholders of the objectionable tenets by a direct criticism of
Cassian’s Conferences. This was the origin of Prosper’s
work “Contra Collatorem,” against the author of the
Conferences, a treatise of considerable power and force, although not
scrupulously fair. The treatise is given
in Gazet’s edition of Cassian. The respect in which
Cassian was held is strikingly shown by the fact that his antagonist
never once names him directly, but merely speaks of him as a man of
priestly rank who surpassed all his companions in power of arguing. The
work consists of an examination of the thirteenth Conference, that of
Abbot Chæremon, on the Protection of God, from which Prosper
extracts twelve propositions, the first of which he says is orthodox
while all the others are erroneous. The propositions
extracted by Prosper are the following:—
(1) That the initiative not only of our actions but also
of our good thoughts comes from God, who inspires us with a good will
to begin with, and supplies us with the opportunity of carrying out
what we rightly desire; for “every good gift and every perfect
gift cometh down from above, from the Father of light,” who both
begins what is good, and continues it and completes it in us. c. iii.
This proposition Prosper allows to be catholic and orthodox.
(2) The Divine protection is inseparably present with
us, and so great is the kindness of the Creator towards His creatures
that His Providence not only accompanies it, but even constantly
precedes it, as the prophet experienced and plainly confessed, saying,
“My God will prevent me with His mercy.” And when He sees
in us some beginnings of a good will, He at once enlightens and
strengthens it, and urges it on towards salvation, increasing that
which He Himself implanted, or which He sees to have arisen from our
own efforts. c. viii.
(3) Only in all these there is a declaration of
the grace of God and the freedom of the will, because even of
his own motion a man can be led to the quest of virtue, but always
stands in need of the help of the Lord. For neither does any one enjoy
good health whenever he likes, nor is he of his own will and pleasure
set free from disease and sickness. c. ix.
(4) That it may be still clearer that, through the
excellence of nature, which is granted by the goodness of the Creator,
sometimes the first beginnings of a good will arise, which, however,
cannot attain to the complete performance of what is good unless they
are guided by the Lord, the apostle bears witness, and says, “For
to will is present with me, but to perform what is good I find
not.” Ib.
(5) And so these are somehow mixed up and
indiscriminately confused, so that, among many persons, the question
which depends upon the other is involved in great difficulty; i.e.,
does God have compassion upon us because we have shown the beginning of
a good will, or does the beginning of a good will follow because God
has had compassion upon us? For many, believing each of these
alternatives, and asserting them more broadly than is right, are
entangled in all kinds of opposite errors. For if we say that the
beginning of free will is in our own power, what about Paul the
persecutor, what about Matthew the publican, of whom the one was drawn
to salvation while eager for bloodshed and the punishment of the
innocent, the other while eager for violence and rapine? But, if we say
that the beginning of our free will is always due to the inspiration of
the grace of God, what about the faith of Zacchæus, or what are we
to say of the goodness of the thief on the cross, who by their own
desires brought violence to bear on the kingdom of heaven, and
prevented the special leadings of their vocation? c. xi.
(6) These two, then, viz., the grace of God and
Free-will, seem opposed to each other, but really are in harmony; and
we gather from natural piety that we ought to have both alike, lest if
we withdraw one of them from men we should seem to have broken the rule
of the Church’s faith. Ib.
(7) Adam, therefore, after the fall, conceived a
knowledge of evil which he had not previously, but did not lose the
knowledge of good which he already possessed. c. xii.
(8) Wherefore we must take care not to refer all
the merits of the saints to the Lord in such a way as to ascribe
nothing but what is evil and perverse to human nature.
Ib.
(9) It cannot be doubted that there are by nature
some seeds of goodness implanted by the kindness of the Creator, but
unless they are quickened by the assistance of God they cannot attain
an increase of perfection. Ib.
(10) And for this, too, we read that in the case of Job,
his well-tried athlete, when the Devil had challenged him to single
combat, the Divine righteousness had made provision. For, if he had
advanced against his foe not with his own strength, but solely with the
protection of God’s grace, and, supported only by Divine aid,
without any virtue of patience on his own part, had borne that manifold
weight of temptations and losses, contrived with all the cruelty of his
foe, might not the Devil have repeated with some justice that
slanderous speech which he had previously uttered, “Doth Job
serve God for nought? Hast Thou not hedged him in, and all his
substance round about? But take away thine hand,” i.e., allow him
to fight with me in his own strength, “and he will curse Thee to
Thy face.” But, as after the struggle the slanderous foe dared
not give vent to any such murmur as this, he admitted that he was
vanquished by his (i.e., Job’s) strength, and not by that of God:
although, too, we must not hold that the grace of God was altogether
wanting to him, which gave to the tempter a power of tempting in
proportion to that which he had of resisting. c. xiv.
(11) The Lord marvelled at him (viz., the
centurion), and praised him, and put him before all those of the people
of Israel who had believed, saying, “Verily, I say unto you, I
have not found so great faith in Israel.” For there would have
been no ground for praise or merit if Christ had only preferred in him
what He Himself had given. Ib.
(12) Hence it comes that in our prayers we proclaim God
as not only our protector and Saviour, but actually as our helper and
sponsor. For whereas He first calls us to Him, and while we are still
ignorant and unwilling draws us towards salvation, He is our protector
and Saviour; but whereas, when we are already striving, He is wont to
bring us help, and to receive and defend those who fly to Him for
refuge, He is deemed our sponsor and refuge. c. xvii.
This last extract is in itself perfectly
orthodox, and might be thought merely to express the distinction
between “preventing” and “co-operating” grace;
but the context makes it clear that Cassian means that in some cases
grace “prevents,” while in others the initial movement
towards salvation comes from man, and grace is only needed to
“co-operate.” He
concludes
by warning his
antagonist of the danger of Pelagianism, and expresses a hope that his
doctrine may be condemned by Pope Sixtus as it had been by Celestine
and his predecessors. The last statement fixes the date of the book as
not earlier than 432; for Celestine only died in April in that
year.