Chapter XVI.—The Privation of Memory is Forgetfulness.
24. When I name forgetfulness, and know, too, what I name, whence should I know it
if I did not remember it? I do not say the sound of the name, but the thing which it signifies
which, had I forgotten, I could not know what that sound signified. When, therefore, I re-
member memory, then is memory present with itself, through itself. But when I remember
forgetfulness, there are present both memory and forgetfulness,—memory, whereby I re-
member, forgetfulness, which I remember. But what is forgetfulness but the privation of
memory? How, then, is that present for me to remember, since, when it is so, I cannot re-
member? But if what we remember we retain in memory, yet, unless we remembered forget-
fulness, we could never at the hearing of the name know the thing meant by it, then is for-
getfulness retained by memory. Present, therefore, it is, lest we should forget it; and being
so, we do forget. Is it to be inferred from this that forgetfulness, when we remember it, is
not present to the memory through itself, but through its image; because, were forgetfulness
present through itself, it would not lead us to remember, but to forget? Who will now invest-
igate this? Who shall understand how it is?
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25. Truly, O Lord, I labour therein, and labour in myself. I am become a troublesome
soil that requires overmuch labour. For we are not now searching out the tracts of heaven,
or measuring the distances of the stars, or inquiring about the weight of the earth. It is I
myself—I, the mind—who remember. It is not much to be wondered at, if what I myself
am not be far from me. But what is nearer to me than myself? And, behold, I am not able
to comprehend the force of my own memory, though I cannot name myself without it. For
what shall I say when it is plain to me that I remember forgetfulness? Shall I affirm that
which I remember is not in my memory? Or shall I say that forgetfulness is in my memory
with the view of my not forgetting? Both of these are most absurd. What third view is there?
How can I assert that the image of forgetfulness is retained by my memory, and not forget-
fulness itself, when I remember it? And how can I assert this, seeing that when the image
of anything is imprinted on the memory, the thing itself must of necessity be present first
by which that image may be imprinted? For thus do I remember Carthage; thus, all the
places to which I have been; thus, the faces of men whom I have seen, and things reported
by the other senses; thus, the health or sickness of the body. For when these objects were
present, my memory received images from them, which, when they were present, I might
gaze on and reconsider in my mind, as I remembered them when they were absent. If,
therefore, forgetfulness is retained in the memory through its image, and not through itself,
then itself was once present, that its image might be taken. But when it was present, how
did it write its image on the memory, seeing that forgetfulness by its presence blots out even
what it finds already noted? And yet, in whatever way, though it be incomprehensible and
inexplicable, yet most certain I am that I remember also forgetfulness itself, whereby what
we do remember is blotted out.
The Privation of Memory is Forgetfulness.
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The Privation of Memory is Forgetfulness.