Himself? Then power is overcome by the absence of power. For that which is something
else than power is surely not power, and thus He is found to have dominion over power just
in so far as He is not power. Or again, God, being power, has another power in Himself,
and has dominion over the one by the other. And what contest or schism is there, that God
should divide the power that exists in Himself, and overthrow one section of His power by
the other. I suppose He could not have dominion over His own power without the assistance
to that end of some greater and more violent power! Such is Eunomius’ God: a being with
double nature, or composite, dividing Himself against Himself, having one power out of
harmony with another, so that by one He is urged to disorder, and by the other restrains
this discordant motion. Again, with what intent does He dominate the power that urges on
to generation? lest some evil should arise if generation be not hindered? or rather let him
explain this in the first place,—what is that which is naturally under dominion? His language
points to some movement of impulse and choice, considered separately and independently.
For that which dominates must needs be one thing, that which is dominated another. Now
God “has dominion over His power”—and this is—what? a self-determining nature? or
something else than this, pressing on to disquiet, or remaining in a state of quiescence?
Well, if he supposes it to be quiescent, that which is tranquil needs no one to have dominion
over it: and if he says “He has dominion,” He “has dominion” clearly over something which
impels and is in motion: and this, I presume he will say, is something naturally different
from Him Who rules it. What then, let him tell us, does he understand in this idea? Is it
something else besides God, considered as having an independent existence? How can an-
other existence be in God? Or is it some condition in the Divine Nature considered as having
an existence not its own? I hardly think he would say so: for that which has no existence of
its own is not: and that which is not, is neither under dominion, nor set free from it. What
then is that power which was under dominion, and was restrained in respect of its own
activity, while the due time of the generation of Christ was still about to come, and to set
this power free to proceed to its natural operation? What was the intervening cause of delay,
for which God deferred the generation of the Only-begotten, not thinking it good as yet to
become a Father? And what is this that is inserted as intervening between the life of the
Father and that of the Son, that is not time nor space, nor any idea of extension, nor any
like thing? To what purpose is it that this keen and clear-sighted eye marks and beholds the
separation of the life of God in regard to the life of the Son? When he is driven in all directions
he is himself forced to admit that the interval does not exist at all.
407
The ninth book declares that Eunomius' account of the Nature of God is,…