conditions without an intermediate state; but that there are things that had means, for in-
stance virtue and vice; and there are means (between extremes), for instance grey between
white and black, or some other colour. And they say, that he affirms that the things pertaining
to the soul are absolutely alone good, but that the things pertaining to the body, and those
external (to it), are not any longer absolutely good, but reputed blessings. And that frequently
he names these means also, for that it is possible to use them both well and ill. Some virtues,
therefore, he says, are extremes in regard of intrinsic worth, but in regard of their essential
nature means, for nothing is more estimable than virtue. But whatever excels or falls short
of these terminates in vice. For instance, he says that there are four virtues—prudence,
temperance, justice, fortitude—and that on each of these is attendant two vices, according
to excess and defect: for example, on prudence, recklessness according to defect, and knavery
according to excess; and on temperance, licentiousness according to defect, stupidity accord-
ing to excess; and on justice, foregoing a claim according to defect, unduly pressing it ac-
cording to excess; and on fortitude, cowardice according to defect, foolhardiness according
to excess. And that these virtues, when inherent in a man, render him perfect, and afford
him happiness. And happiness, he says, is assimilation to the Deity, as far as this is possible;
and that assimilation to God takes place when any one combines holiness and justice with
prudence. For this he supposes the end of supreme wisdom and virtue. And he affirms that
the virtues follow one another in turn,117 and are uniform, and are never antagonistic to
each other; whereas that vices are multiform, and sometimes follow one the other, and
sometimes are antagonistic to each other. He asserts that fate exists; not, to be sure, that all
things are produced according to fate, but that there is even something in our power, as in
the passages where he says, “The fault is his who chooses, God is blameless;” and “the fol-
lowing law118 of Adrasteia.”119 And thus some (contend for his upholding) a system of fate,
whereas others one of free-will. He asserts, however, that sins are involuntary. For into what
is most glorious of the things in our power, which is the soul, no one would (deliberately)
admit what is vicious, that is, transgression, but that from ignorance and an erroneous
conception of virtue, supposing that they were achieving something honourable, they pass
into vice. And his doctrine on this point is most clear in The Republic,120 where he says,
“But, again, you presume to assert that vice is disgraceful and abhorred of God; how then,
I may ask, would one choose such an evil thing? He, you reply, (would do so) who is worsted
117 Diogenes Laertius, in describing the system of the Stoics, employs the same word in the case of their view
of virtue.
118 This is supplied from the original; the passage occurs in the Phædrus, c. lx. (p. 86, vol. i. ed. Bekker).
119 The word Adrasteia was a name for Nemesis, and means here unalterable destiny.
120 The passage occurs in Clilophon (p. 244, vol. vi. ed. Bekker).
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Plato; Threefold Classification of Principles; His Idea of God; Different…