will, without any sort of disposal, or ordering [or rather, adequate cause] in the case, whence
it should be previously certain how that free will should determine, then still that first de-
termination of the will must be merely contingent or by chance. It could not have any
antecedent act of the will to determine it; for I speak now of the very first act or motion of
the will, respecting the affair that may be looked upon as the prime ground and highest
source of the event. To suppose this to be determined by a foregoing act is a contradiction.
God’s disposing this determination of the will by his permission, does not at all infringe the
liberty of the creature. It is in no respect any more inconsistent with liberty, than mere
chance or contingence. For if the determination of the will be from blind, undesigning
chance, it is no more from the agent himself, or from the will itself, than if we suppose, in
the case, a wise, divine disposal by permission.
2. It was fit that it should be at the ordering of the divine wisdom and good pleasure,
whether every particular man should stand for himself, or whether the first father of mankind
should be appointed as the moral and federal head and representative of the rest. If God has
not liberty in this matter to determine either of these two as he pleases, it must be because
determining that the first father of men should represent the rest, and not that every one
should stand for himself, is injurious to mankind. For if it be not injurious, how is it unjust?
But it is not injurious to mankind; for there is nothing in the nature of the case itself, that
makes it better that each man should stand for himself, than that all should be represented
by their common father; as the least reflection or consideration will convince any one. And
if there be nothing in the nature of the thing that makes the former better for mankind than
the latter, then it will follow, that they are not hurt in God’s choosing and appointing the
latter, rather than the former; or, which is the same thing, that it is not injurious to mankind.
3. When men are fallen, and become sinful, God by his sovereignty has a right to determ-
ine about their redemption as he pleases. He has a right to determine whether he will redeem
any or not. He might, if he had pleased, have left all to perish, or might have redeemed all.
Or, he may redeem some, and leave others; and if he doth so, he may take whom he pleases,
and leave whom he pleases. To suppose that all have forfeited his favour, and deserved to
perish, and to suppose that he may not leave any one individual of them to perish, implies
a contradiction; because it supposes that such a one has a claim to God’s favour, and is not
justly liable to perish; which is contrary to the supposition.
It is meet that God should order all these things according to his own pleasure. By
reason of his greatness and glory, by which he is infinitely above all, he is worthy to be sov-
ereign, and that his pleasure should in all things take place. He is worthy that he should
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make himself his end, and that he should make nothing but his own wisdom his rule in
pursuing that end, without asking leave or counsel of any, and without giving account of
any of his matters. It is fit that he who is absolutely perfect, and infinitely wise, and the
Fountain of all wisdom, should determine every thing [that he effects] by his own will, even
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DISCOURSE. IV. The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners.