Chapter XVI.—Several Other Things Turned Against the Same Mathematicians.
If no action is performed without a previous desire, and there is no desire without a
want, yet the Divine Being has no wants, and therefore has no conception of evil. And if the
nature of the stars be nearer in order to that of God, being better than the virtue of the best
men, then the stars also are neither productive of evil, nor in want.
And besides, every one of those who are persuaded that the sun and moon and stars are
divine, will allow that they are far removed from evil, and incapable of human actions which
spring from the sense of pleasure and pain; for such abominable desires are unsuitable to
heavenly beings. But if they are by nature exempt from these, and in no want of anything,
how should they be the causes to men of those things which they do not will themselves,
and from which they are exempt?
Now those who decide that man is not possessed of free-will, and affirm that he is gov-
erned by the unavoidable necessities of fate, and her unwritten commands, are guilty of
impiety towards God Himself, making Him out to be the cause and author of human evils.
For if He harmoniously orders the whole circular motion of the stars, with a wisdom which
man can neither express nor comprehend, directing the course of the universe; and the stars
produce the qualities of virtue and vice in human life, dragging men to these things by the
chains of necessity; then they declare God to be the Cause and Giver of evils. But God is the
cause of injury to no one; therefore fate2752 is not the cause of all things.
Whoever has the least intelligence will confess that God is good, righteous, wise, true,
helpful, not the cause of evils, free from passion, and everything of that kind. And if the
righteous be better than the unrighteous, and unrighteousness be abominable to them, God,
being righteous, rejoices in righteousness, and unrighteousness is hateful to Him, being
opposed and hostile to righteousness. Therefore God is not the author of unrighteousness.
If that which profits is altogether good, and temperance is profitable to one’s house and
life and friends, then temperance is good. And if temperance be in its nature good, and li-
centiousness be opposed to temperance, and that which is opposed to good be evil, then li-
centiousness is evil. And if licentiousness be in its nature evil, and out of licentiousness come
adulteries, thefts, quarrels, and murders, then a licentious life is in its nature evil. But the
Divine Being is not by nature implicated in evils. Therefore our birth is not the cause of
these things.
If the temperate are better than the incontinent, and incontinence is abominable to
them, and God rejoices in temperance, being free from the knowledge of passions, then in-
continence is hateful also to God. Moreover, that the action which is in accordance with
temperance, being a virtue, is better than that which is in accordance with incontinence,
2752 γένεσις = birth, i.e., our life is not controlled by the star of our nativity.—Tr. [See Hippolytus, vol. v. p.
27, this series.]
Several Other Things Turned Against the Same Mathematicians.
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Several Other Things Turned Against the Same Mathematicians.