328 INSTITUTES OF THE BOOK II.
Second Table, there is considerably more knowledge of them,
inasmuch as they are more closely connected with the pre
servation of civil society. Even here, however, there is
something defective. Every man of understanding deems it
most absurd to submit to unjust and tyrannical domination,
provided it can by any means be thrown off, and there is but
one opinion among men, that it is the part of an abject and
servile mind to bear it patiently, the part of an honourable
and high-spirited mind to rise up against it. Indeed, the
revenge of injuries is not regarded by philosophers as a vice.
But the Lord condemning this too lofty spirit, prescribes to
his people that patience which mankind deem infamous.
In regard to the general observance of the law, concupiscence
altogether escapes our animadversion. For the natural man
cannot bear to recognise diseases in his lusts. The light of
nature is stifled sooner than take the first step into this pro
found abyss. For, when philosophers class immoderate move
ments of the mind among vices, they mean those which
break forth and manifest themselves in grosser forms. De
praved desires, in which the mind can quietly indulge, they
regard as nothing, (see infra, chap. viii. sect. 49.)
25. As we have above animadverted on Plato's error, in
ascribing all sins to ignorance, so we must repudiate the
opinion of those who hold that all sins proceed from precon
ceived pravity and malice. We know too well from expe
rience how often we fall, even when our intention is good.
Our reason, is exposed to so many forms of delusion, is liable
to so many errors, stumbles on so many obstacles, is en
tangled by so many snares, that it is ever wandering from the
right direction. Of how little value it is in the sight of
God, in regard to all the parts of life, Paul shows, when he
says, that we are not " sufficient of ourselves to think any
thing as of ourselves," (2 Cor. iii. 5.) He is not speaking of
the will or affection ; he denies us the power of thinking
aright how any thing can be duly performed. Is it, indeed,
true, that all thought, intelligence, discernment, and industry,
are so defective, that, in the sight of the Lord, we cannot think
or aim at any thing that is right ? To us, who can scarcely
bear to part ^Aita acutaness of intellect, (in our estimation a