OBJECT. IX.
If
sanctifying grace
be requisite to a due approach to the Lord’s table, then no man may come but he that
knows
he has such grace. A man must not only
think
he has a right to the Lord’s supper, in order to his lawful partaking of it; but he must
know
he has a right. If nothing but
sanctification
gives him a
real right
to the Lord’s supper, then nothing short of the
knowledge
of sanctification gives him a
known right
to it: only an
opinion
and
probable hopes
of a right will not warrant his coming.
Answ. 1. I desire those who insist on this as an invincible argument, to consider calmly whether they themselves ever
did,
or ever
will,
stand to it. For here these two things are to be observed:
(1.) If no man may warrantably come to the Lord’s supper, but such as
know
they have a
right,
then no
unconverted
persons may come unless they not only
think,
but
know,
it is the
mind of God,
that unconverted persons should come, and
know
that he does not require
grace
in order to their coming. For unless they know that men may come
without
grace, they cannot
know
that they themselves have a
right
to come,
being without grace.
And will any one assert and stand to it, that of necessity all adult persons, of every age, rank, and condition of life, must be so versed in this controversy, as to have a certainty in this matter, in order to their coming to the Lord’s supper? It would he most absurd for any to assert it to be a point of easy proof, the evidence of which is so clear and obvious to every one of every capacity, as to supersede all occasion for their being studied in
divinity, in order to a certainty of its truth, that persons may come to the sacred table of the Lord, notwithstanding they
know
themselves to be
unconverted
! Especially considering, that the contrary to this opinion has been in general the judgment of protestant divines and churches, from the Reformation to this day; and that the most of the greatest divines that have ever appeared in the world, who have spent their lives in the diligent prayerful study of divinity, have
been fixed in the reverse of that opinion. This is sufficient at least to show, that this opinion is not so plain as not to be a disputable point; and that the evidence of it is not so obvious to persons of the lowest capacity and little inquiry, as that all may come to a certainty in the matter, without difficulty and without study. I would humbly ask here, What has been the case in fact in
our
churches, who have practised for so many years on this principle? Can it be pretended, or was
it ever supposed, that the communicants in general, even persons of mean intellects and low education, not excepting the very boys and girls of sixteen years old, that have been taken into the church, had so studied divinity, as not only to
think,
but
know,
that our pious forefathers, and almost all the protestant and christian divines in the world, have been in an
error
in this matter? And have people ever been taught the
necessity
of this previous knowledge? Has it
ever been insisted upon, that before persons come to the Lord’s supper, they must look so far into the case of a
right
to the Lord’s supper, as to come not only to a full settled opinion, but even
certainty,
in this point? And has any one minister or church in their admissions ever proceeded on the supposition, that all whom they took into communion were so versed in this controversy, as this comes to? Has it ever been the manner to examine them as to their thorough acquaintance
with this particular controversy? Has it been the manner to put by those who had only an opinion and not a certainty; even as the
priests
who could not find their
register,
were put by, till the matter could be determined by Urim and Thummim? And I dare appeal to every minister, and every member of a church that has been concerned in admitting communicants, whether they ever imagined, or it ever entered into their thought, concerning each one to whose admission they have
consented, that they had looked so much into this matter, as not only to have settled their
opinion,
but to be arrived to a proper
certainty
?
(2.) I desire it may be remembered, that the venerable author of the
Appeal to the Learned,
did in his ministry ever teach such doctrine from whence it will unavoidably follow, that no one
unconverted
man in the world can
know he
has a warrant to come to the Lord’s supper. For if any unconverted man has a warrant to worship his Maker in this way, it must be because God has given him such warrant by the revelation of his mind in the Holy Scriptures.
And therefore if any unconverted man not only
thinks, but knows,
he has a warrant from God, he must of consequence, not only
think,
but
know,
that the Scriptures are the word of God. But I believe all that survive of the stated hearers of that eminent divine, and all who were acquainted with him, well remember it to be a doctrine which he often taught and much insisted on,
that no natural man
knows
the Scripture to be the word of God; that although such
may
think
so, yet they do not
know
it; and that at best they have but a
doubtful opinion
: and he often would express himself thus;
No natural man is thoroughly convinced, that the Scriptures are the word of God
;
if they were convinced, they would be gained.
Now if so, it is impossible any natural man in the world should ever
know,
it is his right, in his present condition, to come to the Lord’s supper. True, he may
think
it is his right, he may
have that
opinion
: but he cannot know it; and so must not come, according to this argument. For it is only the
word of God
in the Holy Scriptures, that gives a man a
right
to worship the Supreme Being in this sacramental manner, and to come to him in this way, or any other, as one in covenant with him. The Lord’s supper being no branch of natural worship, reason without institution is no ground of duty or right in this affair. And hence it is plainly impossible for
those that do not so much as
know
the Scriptures are the word of God, to
know
they have any good ground of duty or right in this matter. Therefore, supposing unconverted men have a real right, yet since they have no
known
right, they have no warrant (according to the argument before us) to take and use their right; and what good then can their right do them? Or how can they excuse themselves from presumption, in claiming a
right,
which they do not
know
belongs
to them?—It is said, a
probable hope
that persons are regenerate, will not warrant them to come; if they come, they take a liberty to do that which they do not
know
God gives them leave to do, which is horrible presumption in them. But if this be good arguing, I may as well say, a
probable opinion
that unregenerate men may communicate, will not warrant such to do it. They must have
certain knowledge
of this; else their
right
being uncertain, they run a
dreadful venture in coming.
Answ. 2. Men are liable to doubt concerning their
moral sincerity,
as well as saving grace. Suppose an unconverted man, sensible of his being under the reigning power of sin, was about to appear solemnly to
own the covenant,
(as it is commonly called,) and to profess to give up himself to the service of God in an universal and persevering obedience; and suppose at the same time he knew, that if he sealed this profession at the Lord’s supper, without
moral sincerity,
(supposing him to understand the meaning of that phrase,) he should
eat and drink judgment
to himself; and if accordingly, his conscience being awakened, he was
afraid of God’s judgment
; in this case, I believe, the man would be every whit as liable to doubts about his
moral sincerity,
as godly men are about their gracious sincerity. And if it be not matter of fact, that natural men are so often exercised and troubled with doubts about their
moral sincerity,
as godly men are about their regeneration, I suppose it to be owing only to this cause,
viz.
that godly men being of more tender consciences than those under the dominion of sin, are more afraid of God’s judgments, and more ready to tremble at his word. The divines on the other side of the question, suppose it to be requisite, that communicants should believe the fundamental doctrines of religion
with all their heart,
(in the sense of
Acts viii.
37.
.) the doctrine of
Three Persons and one God,
in particular. But I think there can be no reasonable doubt, that natural men—who have so weak and poor a kind of faith in these mysteries—if they were indeed as much afraid of the terrible consequences of their being deceived in being not
morally sincere
in their profession of the truth, as truly gracious men are wont to be of delusion concerning their experience of a work of grace—or whether they are evangelically
sincere in choosing God for their portion—the former would be as frequently exercised with doubts in the one case, as the latter in the other. And I very much question, whether any divine on the other side of the controversy would think it necessary, that natural men in professing those things should mean that they
know
they are
morally sincere,
or intend any more than that they trust they have that sincerity, so far as they know their own hearts. If a man should come to them,
proposing to join with the church, and tell them, though indeed he was something afraid whether he believed the doctrine of the Trinity
with all his heart,
(meaning in a moral sense,) yet that he had often
examined
himself as to that matter with the utmost impartiality and strictness he was capable of, and on the whole he found reasons of probable hope, and his preponderating thought of himself was, that he was
sincere
in it; would they think such an one ought to be
rejected, or would they advise him not to come to the sacrament, because he did not certainly
know
he had this sincerity, but only
thought
he had it?
Answ. 3. If we suppose sanctifying grace requisite in order to be properly qualified, according to God’s word, for an attendance on the Lord’s supper; yet it will not follow, that a man must
know
he has this qualification, in order to his being capable of
conscientiously
attending it. If he
judges
that he has it, according to the best light he can obtain, on the most careful examination, with the improvement of such helps as he can get, the advice
of his pastor, &c. he may be bound in
conscience
to attend. And the reason is this; Christians partaking of the Lord’s supper is not a matter of mere
claim,
or
right
and
privilege,
but a matter of
duty
and
obligation
; being an affair wherein God has a
claim
and
demand on us.
And as we ought to be careful, on the one hand, that we proceed on good grounds in taking to ourselves a privilege, lest we take what we have no good claim to; so
we should be equally careful, on the other hand, to proceed on good grounds in what we withhold from another, lest we do not withhold that from him which is his due, and which he justly challenges from us. Therefore in a case of this complex nature, where a timing is both a matter of
right
or
privilege
to us, and also a matter of
obligation
to another, or a
right
of his from us, the danger of proceeding
without
right and truth is equal both ways; and
consequently, if we cannot be absolutely sure either way, here the best judgment we can form, after all proper endeavours to know the truth, must govern and determine us; otherwise we shall designedly do that whereby, according to our own judgment, we run the greatest risk; which is certainly contrary to reason. If the question were only what a man has a
right to,
he might forbear till he were sure: but the question is, not only whether
he
has right to attend the supper, but
whether
God
also has not a right to his attendance there? Supposing it were merely a privilege which I am allowed but not commanded, in a certain
specified case,
then, supposing I am uncertain
whether that be the case with we or no,
it will be safest to abstain. But supposing I am not only forbidden to take it, unless that be the case with me, but positively commanded and required to take it, if that be the case in fact, then it is equally dangerous to neglect on
uncertainties, as to
take
on uncertainties. In such a critical situation, a man must act according to the best of his judgment on his case; otherwise he wilfully runs into that which he thinks the greatest danger of the two.
Thus it is in innumerable cases in human life. I shall give one plain instance: A man ought not to take upon him the work of the
ministry,
unless
called
to it in the providence of God; for a man has no right to
take this honour to himself unless called of God.
Now let us suppose a young man, of a liberal education, and well accomplished, to be at a loss whether it is the will of God that he should follow the work of the ministry; and he examines
himself, and examines his circumstances, with great seriousness and solemn prayer, and well considers and weighs the appearances in divine providence: and yet when he has done all, he is not come to a proper certainty, that God calls him to this work; but however, it looks so to him, according to the best light he can obtain, and the most careful judgment he can form: now such an one appears
obliged in conscience
to give himself to this work. He must by no means neglect it under a notion
that he must not
take this honour to himself,
till he
knows
he has a
right
to it; because, though it be indeed a
privilege,
yet it is not a matter of
mere
privilege, but a matter of duty too; and if he neglects it
under these circumstances,
he neglects what, according to his own best judgment, he
thinks
God requires of him, and calls him to; which is to sin against his
conscience.
As to the case of the priests, that could not find their
register,
(
Ezra ii.
.) alleged in
the Appeal to the Learned,
p. 64. it appears to me of no force in this argument; for if those
priests
had never so great
assurance
in themselves of their pedigree being good, or of their being descended from
priests,
and should have
professed
such assurance, yet it would not have availed. Nor did they
abstain from the
priesthood,
because they wanted satisfaction themselves, but they were subject to the judgment of the
Sanhedrim.
God had never made any profession of the parties themselves, but the visibility of the thing, and evidence of the fact to their own eyes, as the rule to judge of the qualification; this matter of
pedigree
being an external object, ordinarily within the view of man; and not any qualification of heart. But this is not the case with regard to
requisite qualifications for the
Lord’s supper.
These being many of them internal invisible things, seated in the mind and heart, such as the
belief
of a Supreme Being, &c. God has made a credible
profession
of these things the rule to direct in admission of persons to the ordinance. In making this profession they are determined and governed by their own judgment of themselves, and not by any thing within the view of the church.