CHAP, til] a trinity IN THE MEMORY. 275
Chap. vii.—There is another trinity in the memory ofhim who thinks over
again what he has seen.
11. But yet again, take the case of another trinity, more
inward indeed than that which is in things sensible, and in
the senses, but which is yet conceived from thence ; while now
it is no longer the sense of the body that is informed from
the body, but the eye of the mind that is informed from
the memory, since the species of the body which we perceived
from without has inhered in the memory itself And that
species,which is in the memory, we call the quasi-parent of that
which is wrought in the phantasy of one who thinks. For it
was in the memory also, before we thought it, just as the body
was in place also before we perceived it, in order that vision
might take place. But when it is thought, then from that
form which the memory retains, there is copied in the eye of
the mind of him who thinks, and by remembrance is formed,
that species, which is the quasi-offspring of that which the
memory retains. But neither is the one a true parent, nor
the other a true offspring. For the sight of the mind which
is formed from memory when we think anything by recollec-
tion, does not proceed from that species which we remember
as seen ; since we could not indeed have remembered those
things, unless we had seen them ; yet the eye of the mind,
which is formed by the recollection, existed also before we saw
the body that we remember ; and therefore how much more
before we committed it to memory ? Although therefore the
form which is wrought in the eye of the mind of him who
remembers, is wrought from that form which is in the memory;
yet the eye of the mind itself does not exist from thence, but
existed before it. And it follows, that if the one is not a true
parent, neither is the other a true offspring. But both that
quasi-parent and that quasi-offspring insinuate something,
whence the inner and truer things may appear more practi-
cally and more certainly.
12. Further, it is more difficult to discern clearly, whether
the will which combines the vision to the memory is not
either the parent or the offspring of some one of them ; and
the likeness and equality of the same nature and substance
cause this difficulty of distinguishing. For it is not possible
y