Well, what do we say to this?
The divine Scripture knows how to use the word “Son” in
both senses, so that in some cases such an appellation is derived from
nature, in others it is adventitious and artificial. For when it speaks
of “sons of men,” or “sons of rams Ps. xxix. 1 (LXX.).,” it marks the essential relation of
that which is begotten to that from which it has its being: but when it
speaks of “sons of power,” or “children of
God,” it presents to us that kinship which is the result of
choice. And, moreover, in the opposite sense, too, the same persons are
called “sons of Eli,” and “sons of Belial 1 Sam. ii. 12. The phrase
is υἱοὶ
λοιμοί, or
“pestilent sons,” as in the LXX. Gregory’s argument
would seem to require the reading υἱοὶ
λοιμοῦ.,” the appellation of “sons”
being easily adapted to either idea. For when they are called
“sons of Eli,” they are declared to have natural
relationship to him, but in being called “sons of Belial,”
they are reproved for the wickedness of their choice, as no longer
emulating their father in their life, but addicting their own purpose
to sin. In the case, then, of this lower nature of ours, and of the
things with which we are concerned, by reason of human nature being
equally inclined to either side (I mean, to vice and to virtue), it is
in our power to become sons either of night or of day, while our nature
yet remains, so far as the chief part of it is concerned, within its
proper limits. For neither is he who by sin becomes a child of wrath
alienated from his human generation, nor does he who by choice addicts
himself to good reject his human origin by the refinement of his
habits, but, while their nature in each case remains the same, the
differences of their purpose assume the names of their relationship,
according as they become either children of God by virtue, or of the
opposite by vice.