of conscience, with respect to these actions. And there is also an approbation of conscience,
respecting the conduct of others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned,
or punished by them, and are conscious to ourselves that if we were in their case, and they
in ours, we should in like manner blame, condemn, and punish them. And thus men’s
consciences may justify God’s anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God’s
greatness, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifestations
he has made of his will to them, &c. strongly impressed on their minds, a consciousness is
excited within them of those resentments, which would be occasioned in themselves by an
injurious treatment in any wise parallel.
There certainly is such a consciousness as this oftentimes within men, implied in the
thoughts and views of the mind, of which, perhaps on reflection, they could hardly give an
account. Unless men’s consciences are greatly stupified, it is naturally and necessarily sug-
gested; and habitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and, as it were, insensibly, arises in
the mind. And the more so for this reason, that we have no other way to conceive of any
thing which other persons act or suffer, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we
ourselves are conscious we have found in our own minds; and by putting the ideas which
we obtain by this means in the place of another; or, as it were, substituting ourselves in their
place. Thus we have no conception, what understanding, perception, love, pleasure, pain,
or desire are in others; but by putting ourselves as it were in their stead, or transferring the
ideas we obtain of such things in our own minds by consciousness in their place; making
such an alteration, as to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires. It
is thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others; and indeed in every thing we conceive
of, belonging to others, more than shape, size, complexion, situation, and motion of their
bodies. And this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception
or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what understanding or volition,
love or hatred are, either in created spirits or in God, if we had never experienced what un-
derstanding and volition, love and hatred, are in our own minds. Knowing what they are
by consciousness, we can deny limits, and remove changeableness and other imperfections,
and ascribe them to God.
But though men in thinking of others do as it were put themselves in their place, they
do it so habitually, instantaneously, and without set purpose, that they can scarce give any
account of it, and many would think it strange if they were told of it. In all a man’s thoughts
of another person, in whatever he apprehends of his moral conduct to others or to himself,
if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning him, rewarding or punishing him,
he necessarily, as it were, puts himself in his stead; and therefore the more naturally, easily,
and quietly sees whether he, being in his place, should approve or condemn, be angry or
pleased as he is.
Natural conscience consists in these two things.
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CHAPTER V. Natural conscience, and the moral sense.