[71.] Knowledge is not the perception of the agreement, or disagreement, of ideas, but
rather the perception of the union, or disunion, of ideas—or the perceiving whether two or
more ideas belong to one another.
Coroll. Hence it is not impossible to believe, or know, the Truth of mysteries, or propos-
itions that we cannot comprehend, or see the manner how the several ideas, that belong to
the proposition, are united. Perhaps it cannot properly be said, that we see the agreement
of the ideas, unless we see how they agree. But we may perceive that they are united, and
know that they belong one to another; though we do not know the manner how they are tied
together.
[22.] Prejudice. Those ideas, which do not pertain to the prime essence of things,—such
as all colours that are every where objected to our eyes; and sounds that are continually in
our ears: those that affect the touch, as cold and heats; and all our sensations,—exceedingly
clog the mind, in searching into the innermost nature of things, and cast such a mist over
things, that there is need of a sharp sight to see clearly through; for these will be continually
in the mind, and associated with other ideas, let us be thinking of what we will; and it is a
continual care and pains to keep clear of their entanglements, in our scrutinies into things.
This is one way, whereby the body and the senses observe the views of the mind. The world
seems so differently to our eyes, to our ears, and other senses, from the idea we have of it
by reason, that we can hardly realize the latter.
[18.] Words. We are used to apply the same words a hundred different ways; and ideas
being so much tied and associated with the words, they lead us into a thousand real mistakes;
for where we find that the words may be connected, the ideas being by custom tied with
them, we think the ideas may be connected likewise, and applied every where, and in every
way, as the Words.
[23.] The reason why the names of Spiritual things are all, or most of them, derived
from the names of Sensible or Corporeal ones—as Imagination, Conception, Apprehend,
&c.—is, because there was no other way of making others readily understand men’s meaning,
when they first signified these things by sounds, than by giving of them the names of things
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sensible, to which they had an analogy. They could thus point it out with the finger, and so
explain themselves as in sensible things.
[48.] Definition. That is not always a true Definition, that tends most to give us to un-
derstand the meaning of a word; but that, which should give any one the clearest notion of
the meaning of the word, if he had never been in any way acquainted with the thing signified
by that word. For instance, if I was to explain the meaning of the word Motion, to one that
had seen things move, but was not acquainted with the word; perhaps I should say, Motion
is a things’ going from one place to another. But, if I was to explain it to one, who had never
seen any thing move, (if that could be,) I should say, Motion is a Body’s existing successively
in all the immediately contiguous parts of any distance, without continuing any time in any.
492
NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.