“In a word, if any one wishes to realise the
truth of what I am urging, let him ask himself this question; when he
wishes to understand anything about God, does he approach the meaning
of ‘the unbegotten’? I for my part see that, just as
when we extend our thought over the ages that are yet to come, we say
that the life bounded by no limit is without end, so is it when we
contemplate in thought the ages of the past, and gaze on the infinity
of the life of God as we might into some unfathomable ocean. We
can conceive of no beginning from which He originated: we
perceive that the life of God always transcends the bounds of our
intelligence; and so we call that in His life which is without origin,
unbegotten. τοῦτο τὸ
ἄναρχον τῆς
ζωῆς
ἀγέννητον
προσειρήκαμεν. The meaning of
the unbegotten is the having no origin from without.” Id. i.
16. As Eunomius made ingenerateness the
essence of the Divine, so, with the object of establishing the contrast
between Father and Son, he represented the being begotten to
indicate the essence of the Son. τὸ
γέννημα.
Id. ii. 6. God,
said Eunomius, being ingenerate, could never admit of
generation. This statement, Basil points out, may be
understood in either of two ways. It may mean that ingenerate
nature cannot be subjected to generation. It may mean that
ingenerate nature cannot generate. Eunomius, he says, really
means the latter, while he makes converts of the multitude on the
lines of the former. Eunomius makes his real meaning evident
by what he adds to his dictum, for, after saying “could never
admit of generation,” he goes on, “so as to impart His
own proper nature to the begotten.” Id. i.
16. As in relation to the Father, so now
in relation to the Son, Basil objects to the term. Why
“begotten”? γέννημα,
i.e., “thing begotten;” the distinction
between this substantive and the scriptural adjective
μονογενής
must be borne in mind. Where did he
get this word? From what teaching? From what
prophet? Basil nowhere finds the Son called
“begotten” in Scripture. Id. ii.
6. We read that the Father begat, but
nowhere that the Son was a begotten thing. “Unto
us a child is born, LXX.,
ἐγεννήθη. unto us a Son is
given.” Is. ix. 6. But His name
is not begotten thing but “angel of great
counsel.” Id.
LXX. If this word
had indicated the essence of the Son, no other word would have been
revealed by the Spirit. Id. ii.
7. Why, if God
begat, may we not call that which was begotten a thing
begotten? It is a terrible thing for us to coin names for Him
to Whom God has
given a “name which is above every name.” Phil. ii. 9. We must not add to or take from what
is delivered to us by the Spirit. Id. ii.
8. Things
are not made for names, but names for things. Id. ii.
4. Eunomius unhappily was led by
distinction of name into distinction of being. Id. ii.
3. If the Son is begotten in the sense
in which Eunomius uses the word, He is neither begotten of the
essence of God nor begotten from eternity. Eunomius represents
the Son as not of the essence of the Father, because begetting is
only to be thought of as a sensual act and idea, and therefore is
entirely unthinkable in connexion with the being of God.
“The essence of God does not admit of begetting; no other
essence exists for the Son’s begetting; therefore I say that
the Son was begotten when non-existent.” Id. ii.
18. Basil rejoins that no analogy can
hold between divine generation or begetting and human generation or
begetting. “Living beings which are subject to death
generate through the operation of the senses: but we must not
on this account conceive of God in the same manner; nay, rather
shall we be hence guided to the truth that, because corruptible
beings operate in this manner, the Incorruptible will operate in an
opposite manner.” Id. ii.
23. “All
who have even a limited loyalty to truth ought to dismiss all
corporeal similitudes. They must be very careful not to sully
their conceptions of God by material notions. They must follow
the theologies On the
distinction between θεολογία and
οἰκονομία, cf. p. 7, n. delivered to us by
the Holy Ghost. They must shun questions which are little
better than conundrums, and admit of a dangerous double
meaning. Led by the ray that shines forth from light to the
contemplation of the divine generation, they must think of a
generation worthy of God, without passion, partition, division, or
time. They must conceive of the image of the invisible God not
after the analogy of images which are subsequently fashioned by
craft to match their archetype, but as of one nature and subsistence
with the originating prototype συνυπάρχουσαν
καὶ
παρυφεστηκυῖαν
τῷ
πρωτοτύπῳ
ὑποστήσαντι.
Expressions of this kind, used even by Basil, may help to explain
the earlier Nicene sense of ὑπόστασις.
The Son has, as it were, a parallel hypostasis to that of the
Father, Who eternally furnishes this hypostasis. cf. p.
195, n..… Here the
MSS. vary, but the main sense is not
affected by the omission of the variant phrase. This
image is not produced by imitation, for the whole nature of the
Father is expressed in the Son as on a seal.” Id.
ii. 16. cf. De Sp. Scto. § 15, p. 9, and §
84, p. 40, and notes. “Do not press me with the
questions: What is the generation? Of what kind was
it? In what manner could it be effected? The manner is
ineffable, and wholly beyond the scope of our intelligence; but we
shall not on this account throw away the foundation of our faith in
Father and Son. If we try to measure everything by our
comprehension, and to suppose that what we cannot comprehend by our
reasoning is wholly non-existent, farewell to the reward of faith;
farewell to the reward of hope! If we only follow what is
clear to our reason, how can we be deemed worthy of the blessings in
store for the reward of faith in things not seen”? Id. ii.
24.