PHILOSOPHY
perception which a man has of a sheet of paper does not come
before him as something distinct from the sheet of paper itself.
The two are identical, they are indivisible ; they are not two
but one. The only question then is, Whether the perception
of a sheet of paper (taken as it must be in its indissoluble
totality) is a state of the man's mind, or is no such state. And,
in settlement of this question, there cannot be a doubt that he
believes, in the second place, that the perception of a sheet of
paper is not a modification of his own mind, but is an objective
thing which exists altogether independent of him . . . All that
he believes to be his (or subjective) is his participation in the per-
ception of the object. In a word, it is the perception of matter
and not matter per se, which is the kind of matter in the inde-
pendent and permanent existence of which man believes." 1
Here the very same perception which " a man has " is affirmed
both to be and to be known as being "an independent thing,"
and not a " modification of his own mind." Taken strictly this
ought to mean that the perception which the man has is not
the perception which he has. The only hint at an explanation
of this apparent contradiction is the use of the word " participa-
tion." What alone is his and is believed by him to be his is his
"
participation in the perception of the object." But what does
this mean ? If we are to read it in the light of explicit state-
ments made by Ferrier elsewhere, it ought to mean that the
man apprehends or perceives the objective perception of a sheet
of paper. This, however, involves the distinction which he
here denies between the " perception which a man has " as a
state of his own mind and the objective perception which he
apprehends. On the other hand, ifwe insist on a strict application
of the term "participation," we run into still greater difficulties.
The meaning will then be simply that the "perception which
the man has " is also a perception which some one else has.
1 Ibid. p. 456.
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