And here once more I have in
this argument the support of Eunomius. I will state his nonsense
concisely and briefly, epitomizing his whole meaning. That men do not
make materials for us, but only by their art add form to
matter,—this is the drift of what he says in the course of a
great quantity of nonsensical language. If, then, understanding
conception and formation to be included in the lower generation, he
forbids on this ground the pure notion of generation, by consequence,
on the same reasoning, since earthly creation is busied with the form,
but cannot furnish matter together with the form, let him forbid us
also, on this ground, to suppose that the Father is a Creator. If, on
the other hand, he refuses to conceive creation in the case of God
according to man’s measure of power, let him also cease to
slander Divine generation by human imperfections. But, that his
accuracy and circumspection in argument may be more clearly
established, I will again return to a small point in his statements. He
asserts that “things which are respectively active and passive
share one another’s nature,” and mentions, after bodily
generation, “the work of the craftsman as displayed in materials.”
Now let the acute hearer mark how he here fails in his proper aim, and
wanders about among whatever statements he happens to invent. He sees
in things that come into being by way of the flesh the “active
and passive conceived, with the same essence, the one imparting the
essence, the other receiving it.” Thus he knows how to discern
the truth with accuracy as regards the nature of existing things, so as
to separate the imparter and the receiver from the essence, and to say
that each of these is distinct in himself apart from the essence. For
he that receives or imparts is surely another besides that which is
given or received, so that we must first conceive some one by himself,
viewed in his own separate existence, and then speak of him as giving
that which he has, or receiving that which he has not It is
not quite clear whether any of this passage, or, if so, how much of it,
is a direct quotation from Eunomius. Probably only the phrase about the
imparting and receiving of the essence is taken from him, the rest of
the passage being Gregory’s expansion of the phrase into a
distinction between the essence and the thing of which it is the
essence, so that the thing can be viewed apart from its own
essence..
And when he has sputtered out this argument in such a ridiculous
fashion, our sage friend does not perceive that by the next step he
overthrows himself once more. For he who by his art forms at his will
the material before him, surely in this operation acts; and the
material, in receiving its form at the hand of him who exercises the
art, is passively affected: for it is not by remaining unaffected and
unimpressionable that the material receives its form. If then, even in
the case of things wrought by art, nothing can come into being without
passivity and action concurring to produce it, how can our author think
that he here abides by his own words? seeing that, in declaring
community of essence to be involved in the relation of action and
passion, he seems not only to attest in some sense community of essence
in Him that is begotten with Him that begat Him, but also to make the
whole creation of one essence ὁμοούσιον with its Maker, if,
as he says, the active and the passive are to be defined as mutually
akin in respect of nature. Thus, by the very arguments by which he
establishes what he wishes, he overthrows the main object of his
effort, and makes the glory of the coessential Son more secure by his
own contention. For if the fact of origination from anything shows the
essence of the generator to be in the generated, and if artificial
fabrication (being accomplished by means of action and passion) reduces
both that which makes and that which is produced to community of
essence, according to his account, our author in many places of his own
writings maintains that the Lord has been begotten. Thus by the very
arguments whereby he seeks to prove the Lord alien from the essence of
the Father, he asserts for Him intimate connexion. For if, according to
his account, separation in essence is not observed either in generation
or in fabrication, then, whatever he allows the Lord to be, whether
“created” or a “product of generation,” he
asserts, by both names alike, the affinity of essence, seeing that he
makes community of nature in active and passive, in generator and
generated, a part of his system.