On Bk. VIII. chap. 2,
§ 4 (note 3, continued).
The Causes of the Diocletian
Persecution
.
The persecution of Diocletian,
following as it did a period of more than forty years during which
Christianity had been recognized as a
religio licita
, and
undertaken as it was by a man who throughout the first eighteen years
of his reign had shown himself friendly to the Christians, and had even
filled his own palace with Christian servants, presents a very
difficult problem to the historian. Why did Diocletian persecute? The
question has taxed the ingenuity of many scholars and has received a
great variety of answers. Hunziker (in his
Regierung und Christenverfolgung des Kaisers Diocletianus
und seiner Nachfolger
, Leipzig, 1869),
Burckhardt (in his
Zeit
Constantins
, Basel, 1853, 2d and improved
edition, Leipzig, 1880), and A. J. Mason (in his
Persecution of
Diocletian
, Cambridge and London, 1876), not to mention other
investigators, have treated the subject with great ability and at
considerable
length, and the student is referred to their works for a fuller
examination of the questions involved. It is not my purpose here to
discuss the various views that have been presented by others; but
inasmuch as I am unable fully to agree with any of them, I desire to
indicate my own conception of the causes that led to the persecution.
We are left almost wholly to conjecture in the matter; for our only
authority, Lactantius, makes so many palpably erroneous statements in
his description of the causes which produced the great catastrophe that
little reliance can be placed upon him (see Burckhardt’s
demonstration of these errors,
ibid
. p. 289 sq.). Nevertheless,
he has preserved for us at least one fact of deep significance, and it
is a great merit of Mason’s discussion that he has proved so
conclusively the correctness of the report. The fact I refer to is that
the initiative came from Galerius, not from Diocletian himself.
Lactantius states this very distinctly and repeatedly, but it has been
argued by Hunziker and many others that the persecution had been in
Diocletian’s mind for a long time, and that it was but the
culmination of his entire policy. Having settled political matters, it
is said, he turned his attention to religious matters, and determined
as a step toward the restoration of the old Roman religion in its
purity to exterminate Christianity. But, as Mason shows, this is an
entire misconception of Diocletian’s policy. It had never been
his intention to attack Christianity. Such an attack was opposed to all
his principles, and was at length made only under the pressure of
strong external reasons. But though Mason has brought out this
important fact so clearly, and though he has shown that Galerius was
the original mover in the matter, he has, in my opinion, gone quite
astray in his explanation of the causes which led Diocletian to accede
to the wishes of Galerius. According to Mason, Diocletian was induced
against his will to undertake a course of action which his judgment
told him was unwise. “But the Cæsar [Galerius] was the
younger and the stronger man; and a determination to do has always an
advantage over the determination not to do. At length Diocletian broke
down so far as to offer to forbid the profession of the faith within
the walls of his palace and under the eagles of his legions. He was
sure it was a mistaken policy. It was certainly distasteful to himself.
The army would suffer greatly by the loss. Diocletian would have to
part with servants to whom he was attached,” &c. To my mind,
it is impossible to believe that Diocletian—great and wise
emperor as he had proved himself, and with an experience of over
eighteen years of imperial power during which he had always shown
himself master—can thus have yielded simply to the importunity of
another man. Our knowledge of Diocletian’s character should lead
us to repudiate absolutely such a supposition. Feeling the difficulty
of his own supposition, Mason suggests that Diocletian may have felt
that it would be better for him to begin the persecution himself, and
thus hold it within some bounds, than to leave it for Galerius to
conduct when he should become emperor two years later. But certainly
if, as Mason assumes, Diocletian was convinced that the measure was in
itself vicious and impolitic, that was a most remarkable course to
pursue. To do a bad thing in order to leave no excuse for a successor
to do the same thing in a worse way—certainly that is hardly what
we should expect from the strongest and the wisest ruler Rome had seen
for three centuries. If he believed it ought not to be done, we may be
sure he would not have done it, and that neither Galerius nor any one
else could compel him to. He was not such a helpless tool in the hands
of others, nor was he so devoid of resources as to be obliged to
prevent a successor’s folly and wickedness by anticipating him in
it, nor so devoid of sense as to believe that he could. It is, in my
opinion, absolutely necessary to assume that Diocletian was convinced
of the necessity of proceeding against the Christians before he took
the step he did. How then are we to account for this change in his
opinions? Burckhardt attributes the change to the discovery of a plot
among the Christians. But the question naturally arises, what motive
can the Christians have had for forming a plot against an emperor so
friendly to them and a government under which they enjoyed such high
honors? Burckhardt gives no satisfactory answer to this very pertinent
query, and consequently his theory has not found wide acceptance. And
yet I believe he is upon the right track in speaking of a plot, though
he has not formed the right conception of its causes and nature, and
has not been able to urge any known facts in direct support of his
theory. In my opinion the key to the mystery lies in the fact which
Lactantius states and the truth of which Mason demonstrates, but which
Burckhardt quite overlooks, that the initiative came from Galerius, not
Diocletian, viewed in the light of the facts that Galerius had long
been known to be a bitter enemy of the Christians, and that he was to
succeed Diocletian within a couple of years. The course of events might
be pictured somewhat as follows. Some of the Christian officials and
retainers of Diocletian, fearing what might happen upon the accession
of Galerius, who was known to be a deadly enemy of the Christians, and
who might be expected, if not to persecute, at least to be a deadly
enemy of the Christian officials that had enjoyed Diocletian’s
favor (Galerius himself had only heathen officials in his court),
conceived the idea of frustrating in some way the appointed
succession and
secure it for some one who would be more favorable to them (possibly
for the young Constantine, who was then at Diocletian’s court,
and who, as we know, was later so cordially hated by Galerius). It may
have been hoped by some of them that it would be possible in the end to
win Diocletian himself over to the side of Christianity, and then
induce him to change the succession and transmit the power to a fitter
prince. There may thus have been nothing distinctly treasonable in the
minds of any of them, but there may have been enough to arouse the
suspicions of Galerius himself, who was the one most deeply interested,
and who was always well aware of the hatred which the Christians
entertained toward him. We are told by Lactantius that Galerius spent a
whole winter with Diocletian, endeavoring to persuade him to persecute.
The latter is but a conclusion drawn by Lactantius from the events
which followed; for he tells us himself that their conferences were
strictly private, and that no one knew to what they pertained. But why
did the persecution of the Christians at this particular time seem so
important a thing to Galerius that he should make this long and
extraordinary visit to Nicomedia? Was it the result of a fresh
accession of religious zeal on his part? I confess myself unable to
believe that Galerius’ piety lay at the bottom of the matter, and
at any rate, knowing that he would himself be master of the empire in
two years, why could he not wait until he could take matters into his
own hands and carry them out after his own methods? No one, so far as I
know, has answered this question; and yet it is a very pertinent one.
It might be said that Galerius was afraid that he should not be able to
carry out such measures unless they had had the sanction of his great
predecessor. But Galerius never showed, either as Cæsar or
Augustus, any lack of confidence in himself, and I am inclined to think
that he would have preferred to enjoy the glory of the great
undertaking himself rather than give it all to another, had he been
actuated simply by general reasons of hostility toward the Church. But
if we suppose that he had conceived a suspicion of such a plan as has
been suggested, we explain fully his remarkable visit and his long and
secret interviews with Diocletian. There was no place in which he could
discover more about the suspected plot (which he might well fancy to be
more serious than it really was) than in Nicomedia itself; and if such
a plot was on foot, it was of vital importance to unearth it and reveal
it to Diocletian. We may believe then that Galerius busied himself
during the whole winter in investigating matters, and that long after
he had become thoroughly convinced of the existence of a plot
Diocletian remained skeptical.
We may suppose that at the same
time whatever vague plans were in the minds of any of the Christians
were crystallizing during that winter, as they began to realize that
Galerius’ hold upon the emperor was such that the latter could
never be brought to break with him. We may thus imagine that while
Galerius was seeking evidence of a plot, the plot itself was growing
and taking a more serious shape in the minds at least some of the more
daring and worldly minded Christians. Finally, sufficient proof was
gathered to convince even Diocletian that there was some sort of a plot
on foot, and that the plotters were Christians. The question then arose
what course should be pursued in the matter. And this question may well
have caused the calling together of a number of counsellors and the
consultation of the oracle of Apollo of which Lactantius tells us.
Galerius naturally wished to exterminate the Christians as a whole,
knowing their universal hostility to him; but Diocletian just as
naturally wished to punish only such as were concerned in the plot, and
was by no means convinced that the Christians as a whole were engaged
in it. The decision which was reached, and which is exhibited in the
edict of the 24th of February, 303 seems to confirm in a remarkable
manner the theory which has been presented. Instead of issuing an edict
against Christians in general, Diocletian directs his blows solely
against Christians in governmental circles,—public officials and
servants in official families (cf. the interpretation of the edict
given above in Bk. VIII. chap. 2, note 6). This is certainly not the
procedure of an emperor who is persecuting on religious grounds. The
church officers should in that case have been first attacked as they
had been by Decius and Valerian. The singling out of Christians in
official circles—and the low as well as the high ones, the
servants as well as the masters—is a clear indication that the
motive was political, not religious. Moreover, that the edict was drawn
in such mild terms is a confirmation of this. These men were certainly
not all guilty, and it was not necessary to put them all to death. It
was necessary to put an end to the plot in the most expeditious and
complete way. The plotters should be shown that their plot was
discovered, and the whole thing should be broken up by causing some of
them to renounce their faith, by degrading and depriving of citizenship
all that would not renounce it. It was a very shrewd move. Executions
would but have increased the rebellious spirit and caused the plot to
spread. But Diocletian was well aware that any one that renounced his
faith would lose caste with his fellow-Christians, and even if he had
been a plotter in the past, he could never hope to gain anything in the
future from the accession of a Christian emperor. He was
careful moreover to
provide against any danger from those who refused to renounce their
faith, by putting them into a position where it would be impossible for
them to accomplish anything in that line in the future. He knew that a
plot which had no support within official circles would be of no
account and was not to be feared. The action, based on the grounds
given, was worthy of Diocletian’s genius; explained in any other
way it becomes, in my opinion, meaningless. A further confirmation of
the view which has been presented is found in the silence of Lactantius
and Eusebius. The former was in Nicomedia, and cannot have failed to
know the ostensible if not the true cause of the great persecution.
Diocletian cannot have taken such a step without giving some reason for
it, and doubtless that reason was stated in the preambles of his
edicts, as is the case in the edicts of other emperors; but as it
happens, while we know the substance of all the edicts, not a single
preamble has been preserved. May it not be possible that the
Christians, who preserved the terms of the edicts, found the preambles
distasteful because derogatory to some of themselves and yet
unfortunately not untrue? The reasons which Lactantius gives are
palpable makeshifts, and indeed he does not venture to state them
categorically. “I have learned,” he says, “that the
cause of his fury was as follows.” Doubtless he had heard it thus
in Christian circles; but doubtless he had heard it otherwise from
heathen or from the edicts themselves; and he can hardly, as a sensible
man, have been fully satisfied with his own explanation of the matter.
Eusebius attempts no explanation. He tells us in chapter I, above, that
the Church just before the persecution was in an abominable state and
full of unworthy Christians, and yet he informs us that he will pass by
the unpleasant facts to dwell upon the brighter side for the
edification of posterity. Was the cause of the persecution one of the
unpleasant facts? He calls it a judgment of God. Was it a merited
judgment upon some who had been traitors to their country? He gives us
his opinion as to the causes of the persecution of Decius and Valerian;
why is he silent about the causes of this greatest of all the
persecutions? His silence in the present case is eloquent.
The course of events after the
publication of the First Edict is not difficult to follow. Fire broke
out twice in the imperial palace. Lactantius ascribes it to Galerius,
who was supposed to have desired to implicate the Christians; but, as
Burckhardt remarks, Diocletian was not the man to be deceived in that
way, and we may dismiss the suspicion as groundless. That the fires
were accidental is possible, but extremely improbable. Diocletian at
least believed that they were kindled by Christians, and it must be
confessed that he had some ground for his belief. At any rate, whether
true or not, the result was the torture (for the sake of extorting
evidence) and the execution of some of his most faithful servants (see
Bk. VIII. chap. 6). It had become an earnest matter with Diocletian,
and he was beginning to feel—as he had never had occasion to feel
before—that a society within the empire whose claims were looked
upon as higher than those of the state itself, and duty to which
demanded, in case of a disagreement between it and the state,
insubordination, and even treason, toward the latter, was too dangerous
an institution to tolerate longer, however harmless it might be under
ordinary circumstances. It was at about this time that there occurred
rebellions in Melitene and Syria, perhaps in consequence of the
publication of the First Edict; at any rate, the Christians, who were
regarded with ever increasing suspicion, were believed to be in part at
least responsible for the outbreaks, and the result was that a second
edict was issued, commanding that all the rulers of the churches should
be thrown into prison (see above, Bk. VIII. chap. 6). Here Diocletian
took the same step taken by Decius and Valerian, and instituted thereby
a genuine religious persecution. It was now Christians as Christians
whom he attacked; no longer Christian officials as traitors. The vital
difference between the first and second edicts is very clear. All that
followed was but the legitimate carrying out of the principle adopted
in the Second Edict,—the destruction of the Church as such, the
extermination of Christianity.