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by such causes, cannot be virtuous; because, so far as they are from these, they are not from
the Will’s self-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth while to offer
any arguments to persuade men to any virtuous volition or voluntary action; it is in vain to
set before them the wisdom and amiableness of ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly
of way of vice. This notion of liberty and moral Agency frustrates all endeavours to draw
men to virtue by instruction or persuasion, precept or example: for though these things may
induce them to what is materially virtuous, yet at the same time they take away the form of
virtue, because they destroy liberty; as they, by their own power, put the Will out of its
equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take the work of self-determining power out
of its hands. And the clearer the instructions given, the more powerful the arguments used,
and the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely they are to frustrate their
own design; because they have so much the greater tendency to put the Will out of its balance,
to hinder its freedom of self-determination; and so to exclude the very form of virtue, and
the essence of whatsoever is praiseworthy.
So it clearly follows, from these principles, that God has no hand in any man’s virtue,
nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or moral influence; that none of the moral
methods he uses with men to promote virtue in the world, have any tendency to the attain-
ment of that end; that all the instructions he has given men, from the beginning of the
worked to this day, by prophets or apostles, or by his Son Jesus Christ; that all his counsels,
invitations, promises, threatenings, warnings, and expostulations; that all means he has used
with men, in ordinances, or providences; yea, all influences of his Spirit, ordinary and ex-
traordinary, have had no tendency at all to excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to
promote any thing morally good and commendable, in any respect.—For there is no way
that these or any other means can promote virtue, but one of these three. Either, (1.) By a
physical operation on the heart. But all effects that are wrought in men in this way, have no
virtue in them, by the concurring voice of all Arminians. Or, (2.) Morally, by exhibiting
Motives to the understandings, to excite good acts in the Will. But it has been demonstrated,
that volitions excited by Motives, are necessary, and not excited by a self-moving power;
and therefore, by their principles, there is no virtue in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving the
Will an opportunity to determine itself concerning the objects proposed, either to choose
or reject, by its own uncaused, unmoved, uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be
all, then all those means do no more to promote virtue than vice: for they do nothing but
presented. A crop will not follow without the union of two things, seed and soil. If both be good, the crop will
be good, but not otherwise. That motive which determines the will, cannot arise from any other cause than the
object and the disposition united. And then only can the determining motive be good, when it results from a
good object applied to a good disposition, or state of mind. These things duly considered will sufficiently prove
why Calvinists use counsels, exhortations, invitations, &c.—W.
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SECTION VII. Arminian notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence…