SECT. IV.
Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul.
The author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures, in answer
to that objection against his doctrine of a self-determining power in the Will, (p. 68—69.)
That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this
manner rather than another, allows that it is thus in corporeal things, which are, properly
and philosophically speaking, passive being; but denies it is thus in spirits, which are beings
of an active nature, who have the spring of action within themselves, and can determine
themselves. By which it is plainly supposed, that such an event as an act of the Will, may
come to pass in a spirit, without a sufficient reason why it comes to pass, or why it is after
this manner, rather than another. But certainly this author, in this matter, must be very
unwary and inadvertent. For,
1. The objection or difficulty proposed by him seems to be forgotten in his answer or
solution. The very difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this: How an event can come to
pass without a sufficient reason why it is, or why it is in this manner rather than another?
Instead of solving this difficulty, with regard to Volition, as he proposes, he forgets himself,
and answers another question quite diverse, viz. What is a sufficient reason why it is, and
why it is in this manner rather than another? And he assigns the active being’s own determ-
ination as the Cause, and a Cause sufficient for the effect; and leaves all the difficulty unre-
solved, even, How the soul’s own determination, which he speaks of, came to exist, and to
be what it was, without a Cause? The activity of the soul may enable it to be the Cause of
effects; but it does not at all enable it to be the subject of effects which have no Cause; which
is the thing this author supposes concerning acts of the Will. Activity of nature will no more
enable a being to produce effects, and determine the manner of their existence, within itself,
without a Cause, than out of itself, in some other being. But if an active being should, through
its activity, produce and determine an effect in some external object, how absurd would it
be to say, that the effect was produced without a Cause!
2. The question is not so much, How a spirit endowed with activity comes to act, as why
it exerts such an act, and not another; or why it acts with such a particular determination?
If activity of nature be the Cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts, and does
not lie still; yet that alone is not the Cause why its action is thus and thus limited, directed,
and determined. Active nature is a general thing; it is an ability or tendency of nature to
action, generally taken; which may be a Cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is
given; but this alone cannot be a sufficient Cause why the soul exerts such a particular act,
at such a time, rather than others. In order to this there must be something besides a general
tendency to action; there must also be a particular tendency to that individual action.—If
it should be asked, why the soul of man uses its activity, in such a manner as it does; and it
should be answered, that the soul uses its activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it has
SECTION IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul.
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SECTION IV. Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity…