there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder, but that a contrary temper might
have agreed or consisted as well with that nature of things as this?
And in the first place, to assert this would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very
supposition. For here it is supposed, that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or
consent of being to being. Now certainly agreement itself to being in general must necessarily
agree better with general existence, than opposition and contrariety to it.
I observe, secondly, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gives that
which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as ob-
served, God himself is in effect being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself necessary,
that God should agree with himself, be united with himself, or love himself: and therefore,
when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary
nature, than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.
Let it be noted, thirdly, that by this temper only can created beings be united to and
agree with one another. This appears, because it consists in consent and union to being in
general: which implies agreement and union with every particular being, except in such
cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union to general existence.
But certainly, if any particular created being were of a temper to oppose being in general,
that would infer the most universal and greatest possible discord, not only of creatures with
their Creator, but of created beings one with another.
Fourthly, There is no other temper but this, whereby a man can agree with himself, or
be without self-inconsistence, i.e. without having some inclinations and relishes repugnant
to others; and that for these reasons. Every being that has understanding and will necessarily
loves happiness. For, to suppose any being not to love happiness, would be to suppose he
did not love what was agreeable to him; which is a contradiction: or at least would imply,
that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the same as to say that he has no such
thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every being who has a faculty of will, must of
necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with himself,
and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations
whereby beings desire the happiness of being in general, and must be against a disposition
to the misery of being in general: because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his
own happiness. For if a temper inclined to the misery of being in general prevailed universally,
it is apparent, it would tend to universal misery. But he that loves a tendency to universal
misery, in effect loves a tendency to his own misery: and as he necessarily hates his own
misery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another. And besides, it necessarily follows
from self-love, that men love to be loved by others; because in this others’ love agrees with
their own love. But if men love hatred to being in general, they would in effect love the
hatred of themselves; and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural in-
clination contrary to another.
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CHAPTER VIII. Whether virtue be founded in sentiment.