Upon this I recurred to the
definition which she had previously given of the soul, and I said that
to my thinking her definition had not indicated ἐνδεδεῖχθαι. Gregory constantly uses ἐνδείκνυσθαι
(middle) transitively, e.g. 202 C, 203 A, C,
208 B, and above, 189 A, so that it is possible that we have here, in
the passive form, a deponent (transitive) perfect; moreover the sense
seems to require it. Gregory objects that in what has been said
all the powers which analysis finds in the soul have not been
set forth with sufficient fulness: an exhaustive account of them
has not been given; and he immediately proceeds to name other
δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι which have not been taken into consideration. That this view
of the passage is correct is further shown by 202 C, where, the present
objection having been treated at length, it is concluded that there is
no real ground for quarrelling with the definition of soul ὡς ἐλλειπῶς
ἐνδειξαμένῳ
τὴν φύσιν. Krabinger therefore is right in dropping ἐννοουμένῳ, which two of his mss. exhibit,
and which Sifanus translates as governing τὰς…δυνάμεις, as if the sense were, “When I consider all the
powers of the soul, I do not think that your definition has been made
good.”
distinctly enough all the powers of the soul which are a matter of
observation. It declares the soul to be an intellectual essence which
imparts to the organic body a force of life by which the senses
operate. Now the soul is not thus operative only in our scientific and
speculative intellect; it does not produce results in that world only,
or employ the organs of sense only for this their natural work. On the
contrary, we observe in our nature many emotions of desire and many of
anger; and both these exist in us as qualities of our kind, and we see
both of them in their manifestations displaying further many most
subtle differences. There are many states, for instance, which are
occasioned by desire; many others which on the other hand proceed from
anger; and none of them are of the body; but that which is not of the
body is plainly intellectual. Now The
syllogism implied in the following words is this:—
The emotions are something
intellectual (because incorporeal).
Therefore the emotions are soul
(or souls).
This conclusion is
obviously false; logically, by reason of the fallacy of “the
undistributed middle”; ontologically, because it requires a false
premise additional (i.e. “everything intellectual is
soul”) to make it true. Macrina directly after this piece of bad
logic deprecates the use of the syllogism. Is this accidental? It looks
almost like an excuse for not going into technicalities and exposing
this fallacy, which she has detected in her opponent’s statement.
Macrina actually answers as if Gregory had urged his objection thus.
“The emotions are not purely intellectual, but are conditioned by
the bodily organism: but they do belong to the expression and the
substance of the soul: the soul therefore is dependent on the organism
and will perish along with it.” our definition
exhibits the soul as something intellectual; so that one of two
alternatives, both absurd, must emerge when we follow out this
view to this end;
either anger and desire are both second souls in us, and a plurality of
souls must take the place of the single soul, or the thinking faculty
in us cannot be regarded as a soul either (if they are not), the
intellectual element adhering equally to all of them and stamping them
all as souls, or else excluding every one of them equally from the
specific qualities of soul.