But how does Eunomius, in the
case of the divine doctrines at least—he who “preserves the
natural order” (for I will use our author’s very words),
“and abides by those things which are known to us from the
beginning, and does not refuse to call Him that is begotten by the name
of ‘product of generation,’ since the generated essence
itself” (as he says) “and the appellation of
‘Son’ makes such a relation of words
appropriate”,—how does he alienate the Begotten from
essential kindred with Him that begat Him? For in the case of those who
are called “sons” or “products” by way of
reproach, or again where some praise accompanies such names, we cannot
say that any one is called “a child of wrath,” being at the
same time actually begotten by wrath; nor again had any one the day for
his mother, in a corporeal sense, that he should be called its son; but
it is the difference of their will which gives occasion for names of
such relationship. Here, however, Eunomius says, “we do not
refuse to call the Son, seeing He is begotten, by the name of
‘product of generation,’ since the generated
essence,” he tells us, “and the appellation of
‘Son,’ makes such a relation of words appropriate.”
If, then, he confesses that such a relation of words is made appropriate by the
fact that the Son is really a “product of generation,” how
is it opportune to assign such a rationale of names, alike to those
which are used inexactly by way of metaphor, and to those where the
natural relation, as Eunomius tells us, makes such a use of names
appropriate? Surely such an account is true only in the case of those
whose nature is a border-land between virtue and vice, where one often
shares in turn opposite classes of names, becoming a child, now of
light, then again of darkness, by reason of affinity to the good or to
its opposite. But where contraries have no place, one could no longer
say that the word “Son” is applied metaphorically, in like
manner as in the case of those who by choice appropriate the title to
themselves. For one could not arrive at this view, that, as a man
casting off the works of darkness becomes, by his decent life, a child
of light, so too the Only-begotten God received the more honourable
name as the result of a change from the inferior state. For one who is
a man becomes a son of God by being joined to Christ by spiritual
generation: but He Who by Himself makes the man to be a son of God does
not need another Son to bestow on Him the adoption of a son, but has
the name also of that which He is by nature. A man himself changes
himself, exchanging the old man for the new; but to what shall God be
changed, so that He may receive what He has not? A man puts off
himself, and puts on the Divine nature; but what does He put off, or in
what does He array Himself, Who is always the same? A man becomes a son
of God, receiving what he has not, and laying aside what he has; but He
Who has never been in the state of vice has neither anything to receive
nor anything to relinquish. Again, the man may be on the one hand truly
called some one’s son, when one speaks with reference to his
nature; and, on the other hand, he may be so called inexactly, when the
choice of his life imposes the name. But God, being One Good, in a
single and uncompounded nature, looks ever the same way, and is never
changed by the impulse of choice, but always wishes what He is, and is,
assuredly, what He wishes: so that He is in both respects properly and
truly called Son of God, since His nature contains the good, and His
choice also is never severed from that which is more excellent, so that
this word is employed, without inexactness, as His name. Thus there is
no room for these arguments (which, in the person of our adversaries,
we have been opposing to ourselves), to be brought forward by our
adversaries as a demurrer to the affinity in respect of
nature.