We learn from this canon, there were cases in which an
ambitious prelate, “by making application to the
government” (“secular powers”) had obtained what are
called “pragmatic letters,” and employed them for the
purpose of “dividing one province into two,” and exalting
himself as a metropolitan. The name of a “pragmatic
sanction” is more familiar in regard to medieval and modern
history; it recalls the name of St. Louis, and, still more, that of the
Emperor Charles VI. the father of Maria Theresa. Properly a
“pragmatic” was a deliberate order promulgated by the
Emperor after full hearing of advice, on some public affair. We
find “pragmatici nostri statuta” in a law of a.d. 431. (Cod. Theod., xi. 1, 36); and
“pragmatici prioris,” “sub hac pragmatica
jussione,” in ordinances in Append. to Cod. Theod., pp. 95, 162;
and the empress Pulcheria, about a year before the Council, had
informed Leo that her husband Marcian had recalled some exiled orthodox
bishops “robore pragmatici sui” (Leon., Epist.
lxxvij.). Justinian speaks of “pragmaticas nostras
formas” and “pragmaticum typum” (Novel., 7, 9,
etc.). The phrase was adopted from his legislation by Louis the
Pious and his colleague-son Lothar (compare Novel. 7, 2 with Pertz,
Mon. Germ, Hist. Leg., i., 254), and hence it came to be used
both by later German emperors (see, e.g., Bryce’s Holy
Roman Empire, p. 212), and by the French kings (Kitchin, Hist.
France, i. 343, 544). Augustine explains it by
“præceptum imperatoris” (Brev. Collat. cum
Donatist. iii., 2), and Balsamon in his comment uses an equivalent
phrase; and so in the record of the fourth session of Chalcedon we have
θεῖα
γράμματα
(“divine” being practically equivalent to
“imperial”) explained by πραγματικοὺς
τύπους (Mansi, vii., 89).
We must observe that the imperial order, in the cases contemplated by
the canon, had only conferred the title of “metropolis” on
the city, and had not professed to divide the province for civil, much
less for ecclesiastical, purposes. Valens, indeed, had divided the
province of Cappadocia, when in 371 he made Tyana a metropolis:
and therefore Anthimus, bishop of Tyana, when he claimed the position
of a metropolitan, with authority over suffragans, was making a not
unnatural inference in regard to ecclesiastical limits from political
rearrangements of territory, as Gregory of Nazianzus says (Orat.
xliii., 58), whereas Basil “held to the old custom,” i.e.,
to the traditional unity of his provincial church, although after a
while he submitted to what he could not hinder (see Tillemont, ix.,
175, 182, 670). But in the case of Eustathius of Berytus, which
was clearly in the Council’s mind, the Phœnician province
had not been divided; it was in reliance on a mere title bestowed upon
his city, and also on an alleged synodical ordinance which issued in
fact from the so-called “Home Synod” that he declared
himself independent of his metropolitan, Photius of Tyre, and brought
six bishoprics under his assumed jurisdiction. Thus while the
province remained politically one, he had de facto divided it
ecclesiastically into two. Photius petitioned Marcian, who
referred the case to the Council of Chalcedon, and it was taken up in
the fourth session. The imperial commissioners announced that it
was to be settled not according to “pragmatic forms,” but
according to those which had been enacted by the Fathers (Mansi, vii.,
89). This encouraged the Council to say, “A pragmatic can
have no force against the canons.” The commissioners asked
whether it was lawful for bishops, on the ground of a pragmatic, to
steal away the rights of other churches? The answer was
explicit: “No, it is against the canon.” The
Council proceeded to cancel the resolution of the Home Synod in favour
of the elevation of Berytus, ordered the 4th Nicene canon to be read,
and upheld the metropolitical rights of Tyre. The commissioners
also pronounced against Eustathius. Cecropius, bishop of
Sebastopolis, requested them to put an end to the issue of pragmatics
made to the detriment of the canons; the Council echoed this request; and the commissioners granted it
by declaring that the canons should everywhere stand good (Mansi, vii.,
89–97). We may connect with this incident a law of Marcian
dated in 454, by which “all pragmatic sanctions, obtained by
means of favour or ambition in opposition to the canon of the Church,
are declared to be deprived of effect” (Cod. Justin, i., 2,
12).