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motion; as we see to be the case with spiders, which are stirred up in a most orderly manner
by a phantasy, i.e., a sort of wish and desire for weaving, to undertake the production of a
web, some natural movement undoubtedly calling forth the effort to work of this kind. Nor
is this very insect found to possess any other feeling than the natural desire of weaving; as
in like manner bees also exhibit a desire to form honeycombs, and to collect, as they say,
aerial honey. 2281
3. But since a rational animal not only has within itself these natural movements, but
has moreover, to a greater extent than other animals, the power of reason, by which it can
judge and determine regarding natural movements, and disapprove and reject some, while
approving and adopting others, so by the judgment of this reason may the movements of
men be governed and directed towards a commendable life. And from this it follows that,
since the nature of this reason which is in man has within itself the power of distinguishing
between good and evil, and while distinguishing possesses the faculty of selecting what it
has approved, it may justly be deemed worthy of praise in choosing what is good, and de-
serving of censure in following that which is base or wicked. This indeed must by no means
escape our notice, that in some dumb animals there is found a more regular movement 2282
than in others, as in hunting-dogs or war-horses, so that they may appear to some to be
moved by a kind of rational sense. But we must believe this to be the result not so much of
reason as of some natural instinct, 2283 largely bestowed for purposes of that kind. Now,
as we had begun to remark, seeing that such is the nature of a rational animal, some things
may happen to us human beings from without; and these, coming in contact with our sense
of sight, or hearing, or any other of our senses, may incite and arouse us to good movements,
or the contrary; and seeing they come to us from an external source, it is not within our
own power to prevent their coming. But to determine and approve what use we ought to
make of those things which thus happen, is the duty of no other than of that reason within
us, i.e., of our own judgment; by the decision of which reason we use the incitement, which
comes to us from without for that purpose, which reason approves, our natural movements
being determined by its authority either to good actions or the reverse.
4. If any one now were to say that those things which happen to us from an external
cause, and call forth our movements, are of such a nature that it is impossible to resist them,
whether they incite us to good or evil, let the holder of this opinion turn his attention for a
2281 Mella, ut aiunt, aeria congregandi. Rufinus seems to have read, in the original, ἀεροπλαστεῖν instead
of κηροπλαστεῖν,—an evidence that he followed in general the worst readings (Redepenning).
2282 Ordinatior quidem motus.
2283 Incentivo quodam et naturali motu.
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Chapter I. translated from the Latin of Rufinus: On the Freedom of the…