When she had finished, I
hesitated a moment, and then said: I am not yet satisfied about the
thing which we have been inquiring into; after all that has been said
my mind is still in doubt; and I beg that our discussion may be allowed
to revert to the same line of reasoning as before The
conclusion of which was drawn, 199 C. “Therefore the soul exists
in the actual atoms which she has once animated, and there is no force
to tear her away from her cohesion with them.” It is to the line
of reasoning (ἀκολουθία) leading up to this conclusion that Gregory would revert,
in order to question this conclusion. What both sides are agreed on is,
the existence merely of the soul after death. All between this
conclusion and the present break in the discussion has been a
digression on the Passions and on Hades. Now Gregory asks, how can the
soul possibly recognize the atoms that once belonged to her? Oehler
therefore does not translate aright, “ich bitte nur den
geführten Beweis…in derselben Folge zu wiederholen:”
but Krabinger expresses the true sense, “ut rursus mihi ad eandem
consequentiam reducatur oratio,” i.e. the discussion (not
the proof), which is here again, almost in Platonic fashion,
personified., omitting only that upon which we are
thoroughly agreed. I say this, for I think that all but the most
stubborn controversialists will have been sufficiently
convinced by our debate not to consign the soul after the body’s
dissolution to annihilation and nonentity, nor to argue that because it
differs substantially from the atoms it is impossible for it to exist
anywhere in the universe; for, however much a being that is
intellectual and immaterial may fail to coincide with these atoms, it
is in no ways hindered (so far) from existing in them; and this belief
of ours rests on two facts: firstly, on the soul’s existing in
our bodies in this present life, though fundamentally different from
them: and secondly, on the fact that the Divine being, as our argument
has shown, though distinctly something other than visible and material
substances, nevertheless pervades each one amongst all existences, and
by this penetration of the whole keeps the world in a state of being;
so that following these analogies we need not think that the soul,
either, is out of existence, when she passes from the world of forms to
the Unseen. But how, I insisted, after the united whole of the atoms
has assumed has assumed, ἀναλαβόντων. The construction is accommodated to the sense, not the
words; τῆς
τῶν
στοιχείων
ἑνώσεως having preceded., owing to their mixing together, a
form quite different—the form in fact with which the soul has
been actually domesticated—by what mark, when this form, as we
should have expected, is effaced along with the resolution of the
atoms, shall the soul follow along (them), now that that familiar form
ceases to persist?