virtuous, nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do,
as moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds.
Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral Agency
of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference of moral
inducements, by which they are capable of being influenced, arising from the difference of
circumstances. A ruler, acting in that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a
moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and promises, rewards and punishments, as the
subject is; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And
therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler
towards his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that respect from the moral Agency
of created intelligent beings. God’s actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a
moral governor, have moral qualifications, and are morally good in the highest degree. They
are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as influenced, in the
highest degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral inducement; viz. the
moral good which He sees in such and such things: and therefore He is, in the most proper
sense, a moral Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of
all virtue and moral good; though by reason of his being supreme over all, it is not possible
He should be under the influence of law or command, promises or threatenings, rewards
or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral Agent are in God,
in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding to perceive the difference between
moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which
some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity
of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice
or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praise-
worthy. And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which
we read of, Gen. i. 26, 27.; chap. ix.) by which God distinguished man from the beasts, viz.
in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein
very much consists the natural image of God; whereas the spiritualand moral image, wherein
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man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency with which he was endowed.
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SECTION V. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency.