deed and to doctrine, and carried us along by that same view and method,227 not merely
into a small section of each virtue, but rather into the whole, if mayhap we were able to take
it in. And he constrained us also, if I may so speak, to practise righteousness on the ground
of the personal action of the soul itself,228 which he persuaded us to study, drawing us off
from the officious anxieties of life, and from the turbulence of the forum, and raising us to
the nobler vocation of looking into ourselves, and dealing with the things that concern
ourselves in truth. Now, that this is to practise righteousness, and that this is the true right-
eousness, some also of our ancient philosophers have asserted (expressing it as the personal
action, I think), and have affirmed that this is more profitable for blessedness, both to the
men themselves and to those who are with them,229 if indeed it belongs to this virtue to re-
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compense according to desert, and to assign to each his own. For what else could be supposed
to be so proper to the soul? Or what could be so worthy of it, as to exercise a care over itself,
not gazing outwards, or busying itself with alien matters, or, to speak shortly, doing the
worst injustice to itself, but turning its attention inwardly upon itself, rendering its own due
to itself, and acting thereby righteously?230 To practise righteousness after this fashion,
therefore, he impressed upon us, if I may so speak, by a sort of force. And he educated us
to prudence none the less,—teaching to be at home with ourselves, and to desire and endeav-
our to know ourselves, which indeed is the most excellent achievement of philosophy, the
thing that is ascribed also to the most prophetic of spirits231 as the highest argument of
wisdom—the precept, Know thyself. And that this is the genuine function of prudence, and
that such is the heavenly prudence, is affirmed well by the ancients; for in this there is one
virtue common to God and to man; while the soul is exercised in beholding itself as in a
mirror, and reflects the divine mind in itself, if it is worthy of such a relation, and traces out
a certain inexpressible method for the attaining of a kind of apotheosis. And in correspond-
ence with this come also the virtues of temperance and fortitude: temperance, indeed, in
conserving this very prudence which must be in the soul that knows itself, if that is ever its
lot (for this temperance, again, surely means just a sound prudence):232 and fortitude, in
verba ignavi et negligentes, reading evidently ἀργῶν. Bengel solves the difficulty by taking the first clause as
equivalent to οὐ λόγων ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ ἐπιοτήμονας…αὐτῶν τῶν ὁρμῶν ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ ἐπιστήμονας. We have
adopted this as the most evident sense. Thus ἄγχων is retained unchanged, and is taken as a parallel to the fol-
lowing participle ἐπιφέρων, and as bearing, therefore, a meaning something like that of ἀναγκάζων. See Bengel’s
note in Migne.
227 θεωρίᾳ.
228 διὰ τὴν ἰδιοπραγίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, perhaps just “the private life.”
229 ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς προσιοῦσιν.
230 The text is, τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν εἶναι. Migne proposes either to read ἑαυτούς, or to supply τὴν ψυχήν.
231 ὃ δὴ καὶ δαιμόνων τῷ μαντικωτάτῳ ἀνατίθεται.
232 σωφροσύνην, σώαν τινὰ φρόνησιν, an etymological play.
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Origen is the First and the Only One that Exhorts Gregory to Add to His…