Now if the term ungenerate did
not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity
entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were called ungenerate
in their heretical sense, merely because He is simple and incomposite,
and if the terms simple and ungenerate are the same in meaning, then
too must the simplicity of the Son be equivalent with ungeneracy. For
they will not deny that God the Only-begotten is by His nature simple,
unless they are prepared to deny that He is God. Accordingly the term
simplicity will in its meaning have no such connection with being
ungenerate as that, by reason of its incomposite character, His nature
should be termed ungeneracy; or they draw upon themselves one of two
absurd alternatives, either denying the Godhead of the Only-begotten,
or attributing ungeneracy to Him also. For if God is simple, and the
term simplicity is, according to them, identical with ungenerate, they
must either make out the Son to be of composite nature, by which term
it is implied that neither is He God, or if they allow His Godhead, and
God (as I have said) is simple, then they make Him out at the
same time to be ungenerate, if the terms simple and ungenerate are
convertible. But to make my meaning clearer I will recapitulate. We
affirm that each of these terms has its own peculiar meaning, and that
the term indivisible cannot be rendered by ungenerate, nor ungenerate
by simple; but by simple we understand uncompounded, and by ungenerate
we are taught to understand what is without origin. Furthermore we hold
that we are bound to believe that the Son of God, being Himself God, is
Himself also simple, because God is free from all compositeness; and in
like manner in speaking of Him also by the appellation of Son we
neither denote simplicity of substance, nor in simplicity do we include
the notion of Son, but the term Son we hold to indicate that He is of
the substance of the Father, and the term simple we hold to mean what
the word bears upon its face. Since, then, the meaning of the term
simple in regard to essence is one and the same whether spoken of the
Father or of the Son, differing in no degree, while there is a wide
difference between generate and ungenerate (the one containing a notion
not contained in the other), for this reason we assert that there is no
necessity that, the Father being ungenerate, His essence should,
because that essence is simple, be defined by the term ungenerate. For
neither of the Son, Who is simple, and Whom also we believe to be
generated, do we say that His essence is simplicity. But as the essence
is simple and not simplicity, so also the essence is ungenerate and not
ungeneracy. In like manner also the Son being generated, our reason is
freed from any necessity that, because His essence is simple, we should
define that essence as generateness; but here again each expression has
its peculiar force. For the term generated suggests to you a source
whence, and the term simple implies freedom from composition. But this
does not approve itself to them. For they maintain that since the
essence of the Father is simple, it cannot be considered as other than
ungeneracy; on which account also He is said to be ungenerate. In
answer to whom we may also observe that, since they call the Father
both Creator and Maker, whereas He Who is so called is simple in regard
to His essence, it is high time for such sophists to declare the
essence of the Father to be creation and making, since the argument
about simplicity introduces into His essence any signification of any
name we give Him. Either, then, let them separate ungeneracy from the
definition of the Divine essence, allowing the term no more than its
proper signification, or, if by reason of the simplicity of the subject
they define His essence by the term ungeneracy, by a parity of
reasoning let them likewise see creation and making in the essence of
the Father, not as though the power residing in the essence created and
made, but as though the power itself meant creation and making. But if
they reject this as bad and absurd, let them be persuaded by what
logically follows to reject the other proposition as well. For as the
essence of the builder is not the thing built, no more is ungeneracy
the essence of the Ungenerate. But for the sake of clearness and
conciseness I will restate my arguments. If the Father is called
ungenerate, not by reason of His having never been generated, but
because His essence is simple and incomposite, by a parity of reasoning
the Son also must be called ungenerate, for He too is a simple and
incomposite essence. But if we are compelled to confess the Son to be
generated because He was generated, it is manifest that we must
address the Father as ungenerate, because He was not generated.
But if we are compelled to this conclusion by truth and the force of
our premises, it is clear that the term ungenerate is no part of the
essence, but is indicative of a difference of conceptions,
distinguishing that which is generated from that which is ungenerate.
But let us discuss this point also in addition to what I have said. If
they affirm that the term ungenerate signifies the essence Essence, substance, οὐσία. Most of
this controversy might have been avoided by agreeing to banish the
word οὐσία entirely
from this sort of connection with the Deity. Even Celsus the
Neo-platonist had said, “God does not partake of substance”
(οὐσίας).
“Exactly,” Origen replies, “God is partaken of, viz.,
by those who have His spirit, rather than partakes of anything Himself.
Indeed, the subject of substance involves questions complicated and
difficult to decide; most especially on this point. Supposing, that is,
an absolute Substance, motionless, incorporeal, is God beyond this
Substance in rank and power, granting a share of it to those to whom
according to His Word He chooses to communicate it? Or is He Himself
this Substance, though described as invisible in that passage about the
Saviour (Coloss. i. 15) ‘Who is the
image of the invisible God,’ where invisible means incorporeal?
Another point is this: is the Only-Begotten and First-Born of all
Creatures to be pronounced the Substance of substances, the Original
Idea of all ideas, while the Father God Himself is beyond all
these?” (c. Cels. vi. 64). (Such a question as this last,
however, could not have been asked a century later, when Athanasius had
dispelled all traces of Neo-platonic subordination from the Christian
Faith. Uncreated Spirit, not Invisible First Substance, is the mark of
all in the Triune-God. But the effort of Neo-platonism to rise above
every term that might seem to include the Deity had not been
thrown away. Even “God is Spirit” is only a
conception, not a definition, of the Deity; while “God is
substance” ought to be regarded as an actual contradiction in
terms.) (of the Father), and not that He has His
substance without origin, what term will they use to denote the
Father’s being without origin, when they have set aside the term
ungenerate to indicate His essence? For if we are not taught the
distinguishing difference of the Persons by the term ungenerate, but
are to regard it as indicating His very nature as flowing in a manner
from the subject-matter, and disclosing what we seek in articulate
syllables, it must follow that God is not, or is not to be called,
ungenerate, there being no word left to express such peculiar
significance in regard to Him. For inasmuch as according
to them the term ungenerate does not mean without origin, but indicates
the Divine nature, their argument will be found to exclude it
altogether, and the term ungenerate slips out of their teaching in
respect to God. For there being no other word or term to represent that
the Father is ungenerate, and that term signifying, according to their
fallacious argument, something else, and not that He was not generated,
their whole argument falls and collapses into Sabellianism. For by this
reasoning we must hold the Father to be identical with the Son, the
distinction between generated and ungenerate having been got rid of
from their teaching, so that they are driven to one of two
alternatives: either they must again adopt the view of the term as
denoting a difference in the attributes proper to either Person, and
not as denoting the nature, or, abiding by their conclusions as to the
word, they must side with Sabellius. For it is impossible that the
difference of the persons should be without confusion, unless there be
a distinction between generated and ungenerate. Accordingly if the term
denotes difference, essence will in no way be denoted by the
appellation. For the definitions of difference and essence are by no
means the same. But if they divert the meaning of the word so as to
signify nature, they must be drawn into the heresy of those who are
called “Son-Fathers i.e.who hold the Father and the Son to
be one and the same Person, i.e. Sabellians. “He here
overthrows the heresy of Sabellius, by marking the persons of the
Father and the Son: for the Church does not imagine a Son-Fatherhood
(υἰοπατορίαν), such as the figment of that African” (Ammonius
caten. ad Joh. I. i. p. 14).,” all
accuracy of definition in regard to the Persons being rejected from
their account. But if they say that there is nothing to hinder the
distinction between generated and ungenerate from being rendered by the
term ungenerate, and that term represents the essence too, let them
distinguish for us the kindred meanings of the word, so that the notion
of ungenerate may properly apply to either of them taken by itself. For
the expression of the difference by means of this term involves no
ambiguity, consisting as it does of a verbal opposition. For as an
equivalent to saying “The Son has, and the Father has not, been
generated,” we too assent to the statement that the latter is
ungenerate and the former generated, by a sort of verbal correlation.
But from what point of view a clear manifestation of essence can be
made by this appellation, this they are unable to say. But keeping
silence on this head, our novel theologian weaves us a web of trifling
subtleties in his former treatise. Because God, saith he, being simple,
is called ungenerate, therefore God is ungeneracy. What has the notion
of simplicity to do with the idea of ungenerate? For not only is the
Only-begotten generated, but, without controversy, He is simple also.
But, saith he, He is without parts also, and incomposite. But what is
this to the point? For neither is the Son multiform and composite: and
yet He is not on that account ungenerate.