§3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence
of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ungenerate.”
Now seeing that Eunomius’ conflict with himself has been made manifest, where he has
been shown to contradict himself, at one time saying, “He ought to be called ‘Son,’ according
to nature, because He is begotten,” at another that, because He is created, He is no more
called “Son,” but a “product,” I think it right that the careful and attentive reader, as it is
not possible, when two statements are mutually at variance, that the truth should be found
equally in both, should reject of the two that which is impious and blasphemous—that, I
mean, with regard to the “creature” and the “product,” and should assent to that only which
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is of orthodox tendency, which confesses that the appellation of “Son” naturally attaches to
the Only-begotten God: so that the word of truth would seem to be recommended even by
the voice of its enemies.
I resume my discourse, however, taking up that point of his argument which we originally
set aside. “We do not refuse,” he says, “to call the Son, seeing He is generate, even by the
name of ‘product of generation573,’ since the generated essence itself, and the appellation
of ‘Son,’ make such a relation of words appropriate.” Meanwhile let the reader who is critically
following the argument remember this, that in speaking of the “generated essence” in the
case of the Only-begotten, he by consequence allows us to speak of the “ungenerate essence”
in the case of the Father, so that neither absence of generation, nor generation, can any
longer be supposed to constitute the essence, but the essence must be taken separately, and
its being, or not being begotten, must be conceived separately by means of the peculiar at-
tributes contemplated in it. Let us, however, consider more carefully his argument on this
point. He says that an essence has been begotten, and that the name of this generated essence
is “Son.” Well, at this point our argument will convict that of our opponents on two grounds,
first, of an attempt at knavery, secondly, of slackness in their attempt against ourselves. For
he is playing the knave when he speaks of “generation of essence,” in order to establish his
opposition between the essences, when once they are divided in respect of a difference of
nature between “generate” and “ungenerate”: while the slackness of their attempt is shown
by the very positions their knavery tries to establish. For he who says the essence is generate,
clearly defines generation as being something else distinct from the essence, so that the sig-
nificance of generation cannot be assigned to the word “essence.” For he has not in this
passage represented the matter as he often does, so as to say that generation is itself the es-
sence, but acknowledges that the essence is generated, so that there is produced in his
573 γέννημα. This word, in what follows, is sometimes translated simply by the word “product,” where it is
not contrasted with ποίημα (the “product of making”), or where the argument depends especially upon its
grammatical form (which indicates that the thing denoted is the result of a process), rather than upon the idea
of the particular process.
He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ungenerate.”
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He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the…