That, if men had a clear view of real truth, they would see that there was no room for their
care and industry, because they would see it to be in vain, and of no benefit; and yet that
God, by having a clear view of real truth, sees their being excited to care and industry will
be of excellent use to mankind, and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea absolutely neces-
sary in order to it: and that therefore the great wisdom and goodness of God to men appears,
in artfully contriving to put them on care and industry for their good, which good could
not be obtained without them; and yet both these things are maintained at once, and in the
same sentences and words, by this author. The very reason he gives, why God has put this
deceitful feeling into men, contradicts and destroys itself; that God in his great goodness to
men gave them such a deceitful feeling, because it was very useful and necessary for them,
and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care and industry for their own good, which
care and industry is useful and necessary to that end; and yet the very thing for which, as a
reason, this great benefit of care and industry is given, is God’s deceiving men in this very
point, in making them think their care and industry to be of great benefit to them, when
indeed it is of none at all; and if they saw the real truth, they would see all their endeavours
to be wholly useless, that there was no room for them, and that the event does not at all de-
pend upon them. 192
And besides, what this author says plainly implies, (as appears by what has been already
observed,) that it is necessary men should be deceived, by being made to believe that future
events are contingent, and their own future actions free, with such a freedom, as signifies
that their actions are not the fruit of their own desires, or designs, but altogether contingent,
fortuitous, and without a cause. But how should a notion of liberty, consisting in accident
or loose chance, encourage care and industry? I should think it would rather entirely dis-
courage every thing of this nature. For surely, if our actions do not depend on our desires
and designs, then they do not depend on our endeavours, flowing from our desires and
designs. This author himself seems to suppose, that if men had, indeed, such a liberty of
contingence, it would render all endeavours to determine or move men’s future volitions,
in vain: he says, that, in this case, to exhort, to instruct, to promise, or to threaten, would
be to no purpose. 193 Why? Because (as he himself gives the reason) “then our Will would
be capricious and arbitrary, and we should be thrown loose altogether, and our arbitrary
power could do us good or ill only by accident.” But if such a loose fortuitous state would
render vain others’ endeavours upon us, for the same reason would it make useless our en-
deavours on ourselves: for events that are truly contingent and accidental, and altogether
loose from, and independent of, all foregoing causes, are independent on every foregoing
cause within ourselves, as well as in others.
192 P. 188, 189, &c.
193 * P. 178, 213, 214.
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SECTION XV. Containing Remarks on the Essays on the Principles of Morality…