weary by creation, nor being defiled by generation, entirely reject from their doctrine the
belief in the Only-begotten, or, if they agree642 that the one activity is exercised by the Divine
power without passion, let them not quarrel about the other: for if He creates without labour
or matter, He surely also begets without labour or flux.
And here once more I have in this argument the support of Eunomius. I will state his
nonsense concisely and briefly, epitomizing his whole meaning. That men do not make
materials for us, but only by their art add form to matter,—this is the drift of what he says
in the course of a great quantity of nonsensical language. If, then, understanding conception
and formation to be included in the lower generation, he forbids on this ground the pure
notion of generation, by consequence, on the same reasoning, since earthly creation is busied
with the form, but cannot furnish matter together with the form, let him forbid us also, on
this ground, to suppose that the Father is a Creator. If, on the other hand, he refuses to
conceive creation in the case of God according to man’s measure of power, let him also
cease to slander Divine generation by human imperfections. But, that his accuracy and cir-
cumspection in argument may be more clearly established, I will again return to a small
point in his statements. He asserts that “things which are respectively active and passive
160
share one another’s nature,” and mentions, after bodily generation, “the work of the craftsman
as displayed in materials.” Now let the acute hearer mark how he here fails in his proper
aim, and wanders about among whatever statements he happens to invent. He sees in things
that come into being by way of the flesh the “active and passive conceived, with the same
essence, the one imparting the essence, the other receiving it.” Thus he knows how to discern
the truth with accuracy as regards the nature of existing things, so as to separate the imparter
and the receiver from the essence, and to say that each of these is distinct in himself apart
from the essence. For he that receives or imparts is surely another besides that which is
given or received, so that we must first conceive some one by himself, viewed in his own
separate existence, and then speak of him as giving that which he has, or receiving that
which he has not643. And when he has sputtered out this argument in such a ridiculous
fashion, our sage friend does not perceive that by the next step he overthrows himself once
more. For he who by his art forms at his will the material before him, surely in this operation
acts; and the material, in receiving its form at the hand of him who exercises the art, is
passively affected: for it is not by remaining unaffected and unimpressionable that the ma-
terial receives its form. If then, even in the case of things wrought by art, nothing can come
642 Reading εἰ for εἰς, according to Oehler’s suggestion.
643 It is not quite clear whether any of this passage, or, if so, how much of it, is a direct quotation from Eun-
omius. Probably only the phrase about the imparting and receiving of the essence is taken from him, the rest of
the passage being Gregory’s expansion of the phrase into a distinction between the essence and the thing of
which it is the essence, so that the thing can be viewed apart from its own essence.
306
He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord's generation;…