Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
For every question is solved from pre-existing knowledge. And the
knowledge pre-existing of each object of investigation is sometimes
merely of the essence, while its functions are unknown (as of stones,
and plants, and animals, of whose operations we are ignorant), or [the
knowledge] of the properties, or powers, or (so to speak) of the
qualities inherent in the objects. And sometimes we may know some one
or more of those powers or properties,—as, for example, the
desires and affections of the soul,—and be ignorant of the
essence, and make it the object of investigation. But in many
instances, our understanding having assumed all these, the question is,
in which of the essences do they thus inhere; for it is after forming
conceptions of both—that is, both of essence and
operation—in our mind, that we proceed to the question. And there
are also some objects, whose operations, along with their essences, we
know, but are ignorant of their modifications.
Such, then, is the method of the discovery [of truth].
For we must begin with the knowledge of the questions to be discussed.
For often the form of the expression deceives and confuses and disturbs
the mind, so that it is not easy to discover to what class the thing is
to be referred; as, for example, whether the fœtus be an animal. For,
having a conception of an animal and a fœtus, we inquire if it be the
case that the fœtus is an animal; that is, if the substance which is
in the fœtal state possesses the power of motion, and of sensation
besides. So that the inquiry is regarding functions and sensations in a
substance previously known. Consequently the man who proposes the question
is to be first asked, what he calls an animal. Especially is this to be
done whenever we find the same term applied to various purposes; and
we must examine whether what is signified by the term is disputed, or
admitted by all. For were one to say that he calls whatever grows and is
fed an animal, we shall have again to ask further, whether he considered
plants to be animals; and then, after declaring himself to this effect, he
must show what it is which is in the fœtal state, and is nourished.
For Plato calls plants animals, as partaking of the
third species of life alone, that of appetency.
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But
Aristotle, while he thinks that plants are possessed of a life of
vegetation and nutrition, does not consider it proper to call them
animals; for that alone, which possesses the other life—that of
sensation—he considers warrantable to be called an animal. The
Stoics do not call the power of vegetation, life.
Now, on the man who proposes the question denying that
plants are animals, we shall show that he affirms what contradicts
himself. For, having defined the animal by the fact of its
nourishment and growth, but having asserted that a plant
is not an animal, it appears that he says nothing else than that what
is nourished and grows is both an animal and not an animal.
Let him, then, say what he wants to learn. Is it whether
what is in the womb grows and is nourished, or is it whether it
possesses any sensation or movement by impulse? For, according to
Plato, the plant is animate, and an animal; but, according to
Aristotle, not an animal, for it wants sensation, but is animate.
Therefore, according to him, an animal is an animate sentient being.
But according to the Stoics, a plant is neither animate nor an animal;
for an animal is an animate being. If, then, an animal is animate, and
life is sentient nature, it is plain that what is animate is sentient.
If, then, he who has put the question, being again interrogated if he
still calls the animal in the fœtal state an animal on account of its
being nourished and growing, he has got his answer.
But were he to say that the question he asks is, whether
the fœtus is already sentient, or capable of moving itself in
consequence of any impulse, the investigation of the matter becomes
clear, the fallacy in the name no longer remaining. But if he do not
reply to the interrogation, and will not say what he means, or in
respect of what consideration it is that he applies the term
“animal” in propounding the question, but bids us define it
ourselves, let him be noted as disputatious.
But as there are two methods, one by question and
answer, and the other the method of exposition, if he decline the
former, let him listen to us, while we expound all that bears on the
problem. Then when we have done, he may treat of each point in turn.
But if he attempt to interrupt the investigation by putting questions,
he plainly does not want to hear.
But if he choose to reply, let him first be asked, To
what thing he applies the name, animal. And when he has answered this,
let him be again asked, what, in his view, the fœtus means,
whether that which is in the womb, or things already formed and living;
and again, if the fœtus means the seed deposited, or if it is
only when members and a shape are formed that the name of embryos is to
be applied. And on his replying to this, it is proper that the point in
hand be reasoned out to a conclusion, in due order, and taught.
But if he wishes us to speak without him answering, let
him hear. Since you will not say in what sense you allege what you have
propounded (for I would not have thus engaged in a discussion about
meanings, but I would now have looked at the things themselves), know
that you have done just as if you had propounded the question, Whether
a dog were an animal? For I might have rightly said, Of what dog do you
speak? For I shall speak of the land dog and the sea dog, and the
constellation in heaven, and of Diogenes too, and all the other dogs in
order. For I could not divine whether you inquire about all or about
some one. What you shall do subsequently is to learn now, and say
distinctly what it is that your question is about. Now if you are
shuffling about names, it is plain to everybody that the name
fœtus
is neither an animal nor a plant, but a name, and a
sound, and a body, and a being, and anything and everything rather than
an animal. And if it is this that you have propounded, you are
answered.
But neither is that which is denoted by the name
fœtus
an animal. But that is incorporeal, and may be called a
thing and a notion, and everything rather than an animal. The nature of
an animal is different. For it was clearly shown respecting the very
point in question, I mean the nature of the embryo, of what sort it is.
The question respecting the meanings expressed by the name animal is
different.
I say, then, if you affirm that an animal is what has
the power of sensation and of moving itself from appetency, that an
animal is not simply what moves through appetency and is possessed of
sensation. For it is also capable of sleeping, or, when the objects of
sensation are not present, of not exercising the power of sensation.
But the natural power of appetency or of sensation is the mark of an
animal. For something of this nature is indicated by these things.
First, if the fœtus is not capable of sensation or motion from
appetency; which is the point proposed for consideration. Another point
is; if the fœtus is capable of ever exercising the power of
sensation or moving through appetency. In which sense no one makes it a
question, since it is evident.
But the question was, whether the embryo is
already an animal, or still a plant. And then the name animal was
reduced to definition, for the sake of perspicuity. But having
discovered that it is distinguished from what is not an animal by
sensation and motion from appetency; we again separated this from its
adjuncts; asserting that it was one thing for that to be such
potentially,
which is not yet possessed of the power of
sensation and motion, but will some time be so, and another thing to be
already so
actually;
and in the case of such, it is one thing to
exert its powers, another to be able to exert them, but to be at rest
or asleep. And this is the question.
For the embryo is not to be called an animal from the
fact that it is nourished; which is the allegation of those who turn
aside from the essence of the question, and apply their minds
to what happens otherwise. But in the case
of all conclusions alleged to be found out, demonstration
is applied in common, which is discourse (
λόγος
), establishing one
thing from others. But the grounds from which the point in question is
to be established, must be admitted and known by the learner. And the
foundation of all these is what is evident to sense and to intellect.
Accordingly the primary demonstration is composed of all
these. But the demonstration which, from points already demonstrated
thereby, concludes some other point, is no less reliable than the
former. It cannot be termed primary, because the conclusion is not
drawn from primary principles as premisses.
The first species, then, of the different kinds of
questions, which are three, has been exhibited—I mean that, in
which the essence being known, some one of its powers or properties is
unknown. The second variety of propositions was that in which we all
know the powers and properties, but do not know the essence; as, for
example, in what part of the body is the principal faculty of the
soul.
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Ἐπιθυμητικοῦ
, which accords with what Plato says in the
Timæus
, p. 1078.
Lowth, however, reads
φυτικοῦ
.