being moved by any inducement, in its determinations in such cases as have been mentioned.
117
1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it distinctly in view.
The question they dispute about, is, Whether the mind be indifferent about the objects
presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as two eggs, two cakes, which
appear equally good. Whereas the question to be considered, is, Whether the person be in-
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different with respect to his own actions; whether he does not, on some consideration or
other, prefer one act with respect to these objects before another. The mind in its determin-
ation and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant about the
objects presented; but the acts to be done concerning these objects. The objects may appear
equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them; but the next act
of the Will being about the external actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. these
may not appear equal, and one action may properly be chosen before another. In each step
of the mind’s progress, the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly and
improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference
of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects.
There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ever at all properly choose one
of the objects before another: either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man
chooses to take or touch one rather than another; but not because it chooses the thing taken,
or touched, but from foreign considerations. The case may be so, that of two things offered,
a man may, for certain reasons, prefer taking that which he undervalues, and choose to
neglect that which his mind prefers. In such a case, choosing the thing taken, and choosing
to take, are diverse: and so they are in a case where the things presented are equal in the
mind’s esteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact and experience makes evident,
is, that the mind chooses one action rather than another. And therefore the arguments which
they bring, in order to be to their purpose, should be to prove that the mind chooses the
action in perfect indifference, with respect to that action; and not to prove that the mind
chooses the action in perfect indifference, with respect to the object; which is very possible,
and yet the Will not act at all without prevalent inducement, and proper preponderation.
2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter, seems to be, not distinguish-
ing between a general indifference, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in
a more distant and general view of it, and a particular indifference, or an indifference with
117 The reader is particularly requested to give due attention to these two remarks, especially the former, as
being of the utmost importance in the controversy. If he be pleased to examine, with this view, the most popular
advocates for the liberty of indifference, he will find them continually confounding the objects of choice, and
the acts of choice. When they have shown, with much plausibility, that there is no perceivable difference, or
ground of choice, in the objects, they hastily infer the same indifferences as applicable to the acts of choice. —W.
565
SECTION VI. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly…