CHAP. IV.] WHY THREE PERSONS BUT ONE GOD. 191
which is a specific name, we also call three animals ; but a
horse, and an ox, and a dog, we call only three animals or
substances, which are generic names, or anything else that can
be spoken generically concerning them ; but we cannot speak
of them as three horses, or oxen, or dogs, which are specific
names ; for we express those things by one name, although in
the plural number, which have that in common that is signified
hy the name. For Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, have in
common that which is man ; therefore they are called three
men : a horse also, and an ox, and a dog, have in common that
which is animal ; therefore they are called three animals. So
three several laurels we also call three trees ; but a laurel, and
a myrtle, and an olive, we call only three trees, or three sub-
stances, or three natures : and so three stones we call also three
bodies ; but stone, and wood, and iron, we call only three bodies,
or by any other higher generic name by which they can be
called. Of the Father, therefore, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,
seeing that they are three, let us ask what three they are, and
what they have in common. For the being the Father is not
common to them, so that they should be interchangeably fathers
to one another : as friends, since they are so called relatively
to each other, can be called three friends, because they are so
mutually to each other. But this is not the case in the
Trinity, since the Father only is there father ; and not Father
of two, but of the Son only. Neither are they three Sons,
since the Father there is not the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit.
Neither three Holy Spirits, because the Holy Spirit also, in that
proper meaning by which He is also called the gift of God, is
neither the Father nor the Son. What three therefore ? For
if three persons, then that which is meant by person is common
to them ; therefore that name is either specific or generic to
them, if we regard the custom of speech. But where there is
no difference of nature, there things that are more in number
are so expressed generically, that they can also be expressed
specifically. For the difference of nature causes, that a laurel,
and a myrtle, and an olive, or a horse, and an ox, and a dog,
are not called by the specific name, the former of three laurels,
or the latter of three oxen, but by the generic name, the former
of three trees, and the latter of three animals. But here, where