We have thus generally described
in a few words the several cases in which objects, because they are
deemed to be different from what they really are, produce delusions in
our senses. It is possible, of course, by a more laborious
investigation, to extend one’s enquiry through all things which
are really different in kind one from another, but are nevertheless
thought, by virtue of some accidental resemblance, to be like one to
the other. Can it possibly be such a form of “likeness” as
this, that he is continually attributing to the Son? Nay, surely he
cannot be so infatuated as to discover deceptive similarity in Him Who
is the Truth. Again, in the inspired Scriptures, we are told of another
kind of resemblance by Him Who said, “Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness Gen. i. 26.;” but I do not
suppose that Eunomius would discern this kind of likeness between the
Father and the Son, so as to make out the Only-begotten God to be
identical with man. We are also aware of another kind of likeness, of
which the word speaks in Genesis concerning Seth,—“Adam
begat a son in his own likeness, after his image Gen. v. 3.”; and if this is the kind of likeness
of which Eunomius speaks, we do not think his statement is to be
rejected. For in this case the nature of the two objects which are
alike is not different, and the impress and type imply community of
nature. These, or such as these, are our views upon the variety of
meanings of “like.” Let us see, then, with what intention
Eunomius asserts of the Son that “especial likeness” to the
Father, when he says that He is “like the Father with an especial
likeness, in a peculiar sense, not as Father to Father, for they are
not two Fathers.” He promises to show us the “especial
likeness” of the Son to the Father, and proceeds by his
definition to establish the position that we ought not to conceive of
Him as being like. For by saying, “He is not like as Father to
Father,” he makes out that He is not like; and again when he
adds, “nor as Ungenerate to Ungenerate,” by this phrase,
too, he forbids us to conceive a likeness in the Son to the Father; and
finally, by subjoining “nor as Son to Son,” he introduces a
third conception, by which he entirely subverts the meaning of
“like.” So it is that he follows up his own statements, and
conducts his demonstration of likeness by establishing unlikeness. And
now let us examine the discernment and frankness which he displays in
these distinctions. After saying that the Son is like the Father, he
guards the statement by adding that we ought not to think that the Son
is like the Father, “as Father to Father.” Why, what man
on earth is
such a fool as, on learning that the Son is like the Father, to be
brought by any course of reasoning to think of the likeness of Father
to Father? “Nor as Son to Son”:—here, again, the
acuteness of the distinction is equally conspicuous. When he tells us
that the Son is like the Father, he adds the further definition that He
must not be understood to be like Him in the same way as He would be
like another Son. These are the mysteries of the awful doctrines of
Eunomius, by which his disciples are made wiser than the rest of the
world, by learning that the Son, by His likeness to the Father, is not
like a Son, for the Son is not the Father: nor is He like “as
Ungenerate to Ungenerate,” for the Son is not ungenerate. But the
mystery which we have received, when it speaks of the Father, certainly
bids us understand the Father of the Son, and when it names the Son,
teaches us to apprehend the Son of the Father. And until the present
time we never felt the need of these philosophic refinements, that by
the words Father and Son are suggested two Fathers or two Sons, a pair,
so to say, of ungenerate beings.