The position taken by S. Basil
with regard to the terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις is very concisely stated in his letter to Terentius S. Bas.
Ep. 214, §4.. He says that the Western theologians
themselves acknowledge that a distinction does exist between the two
terms: and he briefly sets forth his view of the nature of that
distinction by saying that οὐσία is
to ὑπόστασις
as that which is common to individuals is to that in
respect of which the individuals are naturally differentiated. He
illustrates this statement by the remark that each individual man has
his being τῷ
κοίνῳ τῆς
οὐσίας
λόγῳ, while he is
differentiated as an individual man in virtue of his own particular
attributes. So in the Trinity that which constitutes the οὐσία (be it “goodness” or be it
“Godhead”) is common, while the ὑπόστασις is marked by the Personal attribute of Fatherhood or Sonship
or Sanctifying Power The
differentia here assigned to the Third Person is not, in S.
Basil’s own view, a differentia at all: for he would no
doubt have been ready to acknowledge that this attribute is common to
all Three Persons. S. Gregory, as it will be seen, treats the question
as to the differentiation of the Persons somewhat differently, and
rests his answer on a basis theologically more scientific.. This position is also
adopted and set forth in greater detail in the treatise, De Diff.
Essen. et Hypost. S. Bas.
Ep. 38 (Benedictine Ed.)., already referred to,
where we find once more the illustration employed in the Epistle to
Terentius. The Nature of the Father is beyond our comprehension; but
whatever conception we are able to form of that Nature, we must
consider it to be common also to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: so far
as the οὐσία is
concerned, whatever is predicated of any one of the Persons may be
predicated equally of each of the Three Persons, just as the properties
of man, quâ man, belong alike to Paul and Barnabas and
Timothy: and as these individual men are differentiated by their own
particular attributes, so each Person of the Trinity is distinguished
by a certain attribute from the other two Persons. This way of putting
the case naturally leads to the question, “If you say, as you do
say, that Paul and Barnabas and Timothy are ‘three men,’
why do you not say that the Three Persons are ‘three
Gods?’” Whether the question was presented in this shape to
S. Basil we cannot with certainty decide: but we may gather from his
language regarding the applicability of number to the Trinity what his
answer would have been. He De Spir.
Sancto, §18. says that in
acknowledging One Father, One Son, One Holy Spirit, we do not enumerate
them by computation, but assert the individuality, so to say, of each
hypostasis—its distinctness from the others. He would probably
have replied by saying that strictly speaking we ought to decline
applying to the Deity, considered as Deity, any numerical idea at all,
and that to enumerate the Persons as “three” is a
necessity, possibly, imposed upon us by language, but that no
conception of number is really applicable to the Divine Nature or to
the Divine Persons, which transcend number On S.
Basil’s language on this subject, see Dorner, Doctrine of the
Person of Christ, Div. 1. vol. ii. pp. 309–11. (Eng.
Trans.). To S. Gregory,
however, the question did actually present itself as one demanding an
answer, and his reply to it marks his departure from S. Basil’s
position, though, if the treatise, De Diff. Essen. et Hyp. be S.
Basil’s, S. Gregory was but following out and defending the view
of his “master” as expressed in that treatise.