cares of his office clamouring on every side, it does not seem to me proper for him suddenly,
as if deaf, to withdraw himself from all these, and devote himself to the work of expounding
to a single student some unimportant questions in the Dialogues of Cicero. The impropriety
of this you yourself apprehend, although, carried away with zeal in the pursuit of your
studies, you will by no means give heed to it. For what other construction can I put on the
fact that, after saying that in this matter there is absolutely nothing improper, you have
immediately subjoined: “Be this, however, as it may, I beg you to do me this kindness, for
I am on the point of embarking on a voyage”? For this intimates that in your view, at least,
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there is no impropriety in your request, but that whatever impropriety may be in it, you
nevertheless ask me to do what you ask, because you are about to go on a voyage. Now what
is the force of this supplementary plea—“I am on the point of embarking on a voyage”? Do
you mean that, unless you were in these circumstances, I ought not to do you service in
which anything improper may be involved? You think, forsooth, that the impropriety can
be washed away by salt water. But even were it so, my share at least of the fault would remain
unexpiated, because I do not propose undertaking a voyage.
3. You write, further, that I know how very painful it is to you to be burdensome to any
one, and you solemnly protest that God alone knows how irresistible is the necessity under
which you make the application. When I came to this statement in your letter, I turned my
attention eagerly to learn the nature of the necessity; and, behold, you bring it before me in
these words: “You know the ways of men, how prone they are to censure, and how any one
will be regarded as illiterate and stupid who, when questions are addressed to him, can return
no answer.” On reading this sentence, I felt a burning desire to reply to your letter; for, by
the morbid weakness of mind which this indicated, you pierced my inmost heart, and forced
your way into the midst of my cares, so that I could not refuse to minister to your relief, so
far as God might enable me—not by devising a solution of your difficulties, but by breaking
the connection between your happiness and the wretched support on which it now insecurely
hangs, viz. the opinions of men, and fastening it to a hold which is firm and immovable. Do
you not, O Dioscorus, remember an ingenious line of your favourite Persius, in which he
not only rebukes your folly, but administers to your boyish head, if you have only sense to
feel it, a deserved correction, restraining your vanity with the words, “To know is nothing
in your eyes unless another knows that you know”?2397 You have, as I said before, read so
many Dialogues, and devoted your attention to so many discussions of philosophers—tell
me which of them has placed the chief end of his actions in the applause of the vulgar, or
in the opinion even of good and wise men? But you,—and what should make you the more
ashamed,—you, when on the eve of sailing away from Africa, give evidence of your having
made signal progress, forsooth, in your studies here, when you affirm that the only reason
2397 “Scire tuum nihil est nisi te scire hoc sciat alter.”—Persius, Sat. i. 27.
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To Dioscorus