and evil, we select the one and avoid the other, we are deserving of praise when we give
ourselves to the practice of virtue, and censurable when we do the reverse. We must not,
however, be ignorant that the greater part of the nature assigned to all things is a varying
quantity 2389 among animals, both in a greater and a less degree; so that the instinct in
hunting-dogs and in war-horses approaches somehow, so to speak, to the faculty of reason.
Now, to fall under some one of those external causes which stir up within us this phantasy
or that, is confessedly not one of those things that are dependent upon ourselves; but to
determine that we shall use the occurrence in this way or differently, is the prerogative of
nothing else than of the reason within us, which, as occasion offers, 2390 arouses us towards
efforts inciting to what is virtuous and becoming, or turns us aside to what is the reverse.
4. But if any one maintain that this very external cause is of such a nature that it is im-
possible to resist it when it comes in such a way, let him turn his attention to his own feelings
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and movements, (and see) whether there is not an approval, and assent, and inclination of
the controlling principle towards some object on account of some specious arguments. 2391
For, to take an instance, a woman who has appeared before a man that has determined to
be chaste, and to refrain from carnal intercourse, and who has incited him to act contrary
to his purpose, is not a perfect 2392 cause of annulling his determination. For, being alto-
gether pleased with the luxury and allurement of the pleasure, and not wishing to resist it,
or to keep his purpose, he commits an act of licentiousness. Another man, again (when the
same things have happened to him who has received more instruction, and has disciplined
himself 2393), encounters, indeed, allurements and enticements; but his reason, as being
strengthened to a higher point, and carefully trained, and confirmed in its views towards a
virtuous course, or being near to confirmation, 2394 repels the incitement, and extinguishes
the desire.
5. Such being the case, to say that we are moved from without, and to put away the
blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of wood and stones, which are
dragged about by those causes that act upon them from without, is neither true nor in con-
formity with reason, but is the statement of him who wishes to destroy 2395 the conception
of free-will. For if we were to ask such an one what was free-will, he would say that it con-
sisted in this, that when purposing to do some thing, no external cause came inciting to the
2389 ποσῶς.
2390 παρὰ τὰς ἀφορμάς.
2391 διὰ τάσδε τὰς πιθανότητας.
2392 αὐτοτελής.
2393 ησκηκότι.
2394 ἐγγύς γε τοῦ βεβαιωθῆναι γεγενημένος.
2395 παραχαράττειν.
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Chapter I. translated from the Greek: On the Freedom of the Will, With…