perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said, as in Isa. xl. 14.
“With whom took he counsel? And who instructed him and taught him in the path of
judgment, and taught him knowledge, and showed him the way of understanding?” There
is no other Divine Sovereignty but this; and this is properly absolute sovereignty: no other
is desirable; nor would any other be honourable, or happy: and indeed, there is no other
conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that his Will
is determined by his own infinite, all-sufficient wisdom in every thing; and is in nothing at
all directed either by inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become senseless
arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end.
If God’s Will is steadily and surely determined in every thing by supreme wisdom, then
it is in every thing necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And, certainly, it would
be a disadvantage and indignity, to be otherwise. For if the Divine Will was not necessarily
determined to what in every case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some degree of
undesigning contingence; and so in the same degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine
Will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind con-
tingence, which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate whatsoever, (if
any such thing were possible,) would certainly argue a great degree of imperfection and
meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a disadvantage, for the Divine Will to
be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at ran-
dom, the greater dignity and advantage. And, consequently, to be perfectly free from the
direction of understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless unmeaning contin-
ence, to act absolutely at random, would be the supreme glory!
It no more argues any dependence of God’s Will, that his supremely wise volition is
necessary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be
something too low, for the Supreme Being to have his Will determined by moral Necessity,
so as necessarily, in every case, to Will in the highest degree holily and happily; then why is
it not also something top low, for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of
his nature, and his infinite happiness, determined by Necessity? It is no more to God’s dis-
honour, to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And, if neither of them be is the
beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as faith itself, with all the advantage of reason and
goodness.—It is strange, to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is neces-
sarily rational, immutably good to his dishonour, then it is not to his dishonour necessarily
to act holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonourable to be necessarily holy and wise, in
the highest possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonourable, necessarily to act holily
and wisely in the highest possible degree; or which is the same thing, to do that, in every
case, which, above all other things, is wisest and best.
The reason why it is not dishonourable to be necessarily most holy is, because holiness
in itself is an excellent and honourable thing. For the same reason, it is no dishonour to be
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SECTION VII. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.