seeing that even now it is possible for the mind at once to contemplate the heavens above
us and to extend its busy scrutiny beyond the horizon, nor is its contemplative power at all
distracted by these excursions into distances so great. There is nothing, then, to hinder the
soul’s presence in the body’s atoms, whether fused in union or decomposed in dissolution.
Just as in the amalgam of gold and silver a certain methodical force is to be observed which
has fused the metals, and if the one be afterwards smelted out of the other, the law of this
method nevertheless continues to reside in each, so that while the amalgam is separated this
method does not suffer division along with it (for you cannot make fractions out of the in-
divisible), in the same way this intelligent essence of the soul is observable in the concourse
of the atoms, and does not undergo division when they are dissolved; but it remains with
them, and even in their separation it is co-extensive with them, yet not itself dissevered nor
discounted1780 into sections to accord with the number of the atoms. Such a condition be-
longs to the material and spacial world, but that which is intelligent and undimensional is
not liable to the circumstances of space. Therefore the soul exists in the actual atoms which
she has once animated, and there is no force to tear her away from her cohesion with them.
What cause for melancholy, then, is there herein, that the visible is exchanged for the invisible;
and wherefore is it that your mind has conceived such a hatred of death?
Upon this I recurred to the definition which she had previously given of the soul, and
I said that to my thinking her definition had not indicated1781 distinctly enough all the
powers of the soul which are a matter of observation. It declares the soul to be an intellectual
essence which imparts to the organic body a force of life by which the senses operate. Now
the soul is not thus operative only in our scientific and speculative intellect; it does not
produce results in that world only, or employ the organs of sense only for this their natural
work. On the contrary, we observe in our nature many emotions of desire and many of anger;
and both these exist in us as qualities of our kind, and we see both of them in their manifest-
ations displaying further many most subtle differences. There are many states, for instance,
1780 κατακερματίζεται
1781 ἐνδεδεῖχθαι. Gregory constantly uses ἐνδείκνυσθαι (middle) transitively, e.g. 202 C, 203 A, C, 208 B,
and above, 189 A, so that it is possible that we have here, in the passive form, a deponent (transitive) perfect;
moreover the sense seems to require it. Gregory objects that in what has been said all the powers which analysis
finds in the soul have not been set forth with sufficient fulness: an exhaustive account of them has not been
given; and he immediately proceeds to name other δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι which have not been taken into
consideration. That this view of the passage is correct is further shown by 202 C, where, the present objection
having been treated at length, it is concluded that there is no real ground for quarrelling with the definition of
soul ὡς ἐλλειπῶς ἐνδειξαμένῳ τὴν φύσιν. Krabinger therefore is right in dropping ἐννοουμένῳ, which two of
his mss. exhibit, and which Sifanus translates as governing τὰς…δυνάμεις, as if the sense were, “When I consider
all the powers of the soul, I do not think that your definition has been made good.”
814
On the Soul and the Resurrection.