I have deluged my discourse with
much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not
leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his inanities; not that we
take pleasure in our author’s indecorum, (for what advantage can
we derive from the refutation of our adversaries’ folly?) but
that truth may be advanced by confirmation from whatever quarter.
“Since,” says he, “our Lord applies these
appellations to Himself, not deeming any one of them first, or second,
or more minute and accurate than the rest, you cannot say that these
names are the result of conception.” Why, he has forgotten his
own object! How comes he by the knowledge of the words against which he
declares war? Our master and guide had made mention of an example
familiar to all, in illustration of the doctrine of conception, and
having explained his meaning by lower illustrations, he lifts the
consideration of the question to higher things. He had said that the
word “corn,” regarded by itself, is one thing only as to
substance, but that, as to the various properties we see in it, it
varies its appellations, being called seed, and fruit, and food, and
the like. Similarly, says he, our Lord is in respect to Himself what He
is essentially, but when named according to the differences of His
operations, He has not one appellation in all cases, but takes a
different name according to each notion produced in us from the
operation. How, then, does what he says disprove our theory that it is
possible for many appellations to be attached with propriety, according
to the diversity of His operations, and His relation to their effects,
to the Son of God, though one in respect of the underlying force, even
as corn, though one, has various names apportioned to it, according to
the point of view from which we regard it? How, then, can what is said
be overthrown by our saying that Christ used all these names of
Himself? For the question was not, who ascribed them, but about the
meaning of the names, whether they denote essence, or whether they are
derived from His operations by the process of conception. But
our shrewd and
strong-minded opponent, overturning our theory of conception, which
declares that it is possible to find many appellations for one and the
same subject, according to the significances of its operations, attacks
us vigorously, asserting that such names were not given to our Lord by
another. But what has this to do with the case in point? Since these
names are used by our Lord, will he not allow that they are names, or
appellations, or words expressive of ideas? For if he will not admit
them to be names, then, in doing away with the appellations, he does
away at the same time with the conception. But if he does not deny that
these words are names, what harm can he do to our doctrine of
conception by showing that such titles were given to our Lord, not by
some one else, but by Himself? For what was said was this, that, as in
the instance of corn, our Lord, though substantively One, bears
epithets suitable to His operations. And as it is admitted that corn
has its names by virtue of our conception of its associations, it was
shown that these terms significative of our Lord are not of His
essence, but are formed by the method of conception in our minds
respecting Him. But our antagonist studiously avoids attacking these
positions, and maintains that our Lord received these names from
Himself, in the same way as, if one sought for the true interpretation
of the name “Isaac,” whether it means laughter Gen. xviii. 12; xxi.
6., as some say, or something else, one of
Eunomius’ way of thinking should confidently reply that the name
was given to him as a child by his mother: but that, one might say, was
not the question, i.e. by whom the name was given, but what does
it mean when translated into our language? And this being the point of
the inquiry, whether our Lord’s various appellations were the
result of conception, instead of being indicative of His essence, he
who thus seeks to demonstrate that they are not so derived because they
are used by our Lord Himself,—how can he be numbered among men of
sense, warring as he does against the truth, and equipping himself with
such alliances for the war as serve to show the superior strength of
his enemy?