Testimonia

Publiek archief van verzamelde en verwerkte bronrecords.
Overzicht / tekstblob

Tekstblob

sha256: 5b3ea8b893a525cbcd487b057967825f1b8fa5c44bb4b268b0e185d3fdbf1dc5 · 2,828 tekens

50. In how many respects the very Being of Created things depends on Laws, or stated methods, fixed by God, of events following one another. 51. Whether all the Immediate Objects of the mind are properly called Ideas; and what inconvenience and confusion arises from giving every Subjective Thought that name. What prejudices and mistakes it leads to. 52. In what respects Ideas, or thoughts, and judgments, may be said to be Innate, and in what respects not. 53. Whether there could have ever been any such thing as Thought, without External Ideas, immediately impressed by God, either according to some law, or otherwise. Whether any Spirit, or Angel, could have any Thought, if it had not been for this. Here particularly explain what I mean by External Ideas. 54. How words came to have such a mighty influence on thought and judgment, by virtue of the Association of Ideas, or from Ideas being habitually tied to words. 55. How far, through Habit, men move their bodies without thought or consciousness. 56. Whether Beauty (Natural and Moral.) and the pleasure that arises from it, in ourselves or others, be not the only object of the Will; or whether Truth be not also the object of the Will. 103 THE MIND. [12.] Being. It seems strange sometimes to me, that there should be Being from all Eternity: and I am ready to say, What need was there that any thing should be? I should then ask myself, Whether it seems strange that there should be either Something, or Nothing? If so, it is not strange that there should BE; for that necessity of there being Something, or Nothing, implies it. [26.] Cause is that, after or upon the existence of which, or the existence of it after such a manner, the existence of another thing follows. [27.] Existence. If we had only the sense of Seeing, we should not be as ready to conclude the visible would to have been an existence independent of perception, as we do; because the ideas we have by the sense of Feeling, are as much mere ideas, as those we have by the sense of Seeing. But we know, that the things that are objects of this sense, all that the mind views by Seeing, are merely mental Existences; because all these things, with all their modes, do exist in a looking-glass, where all will acknowledge, they exist only mentally. It is now agreed upon by every knowing philosopher, that Colours are not really in the things, no more than pain is in a needle; but strictly no where else but in the mind. But yet I think that Colour may have an existence out of the mind, with equal reason as any thing in Body has any existence out of the mind, beside the very substance of the body itself, which 103 The preceding articles were set down from time to time at the close of the work, in two series; the first ending with No. 26. 466 NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.

Alle records · Zoek op deze hash