and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral Virtues, being the effects of the free and
faithful acts of the gardener. If Liberty be absolutely requisite to the morality of actions, and
necessity wholly inconsistent with it, as Arminians greatly insist; then no necessary effects
whatsoever, let the cause be never so good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious; but the Virtue
or Vice must be only in the free cause. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby supposes, the necessity
that attends the good and evil habits of the saints in heaven, and damned in hell, which are
the consequence of their free acts in their state of probation, are not rewardable or punishable.
On the whole, it appears, that if the notions of Arminians concerning Liberty and
moral Agency be true, it will follow, that there is no virtue in any such habits or qualities as
humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness; nothing
at all praiseworthy in loving Christ above father and mother, wife and children, or our own
lives; or in delight in holiness, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, love to enemies,
universal benevolence to mankind: and, on the other hand, there is nothing at all vicious,
or worthy of dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly, malignant, devilish dispositions; in being
ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God, and things sacred and holy; or in being most
treacherous, envious, and cruel towards men. For all these things are dispositions and inclin-
ations of the heart. And in short, there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious quality of
mind; no such thing as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and sin: and the stronger those
habits or dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are
from being so indeed; the more violent men’s lusts are, the more fixed their pride, envy,
ingratitude, and maliciousness, still the further are they from being blameworthy. If there
be a man that by his own repeated acts, or by any other means, is come to be of the most
hellish disposition, desperately inclined to treat his neighbours with injuriousness, contempt,
and malignity; the further they should be from any disposition to be angry with him, or in
the least to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a person, who is of a most excellent
spirit, strongly inclining him to the most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c.
so much is he further from any thing rewardable or commendable. On which principles,
the man Jesus Christ was very far from being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness and
kindness which he performed, these propensities being strong in his heart. And above all,
the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from any thing commendable, his
good inclinations being infinitely strong, and he, therefore, at the utmost possible distance
from being at Liberty. And in all cases, the stronger the inclinations of any are to Virtue,
and the more they love it, the less virtuous, and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious
they are.—Whether these things are agreeable to Scripture, let every Christian, and every
man who has read the Bible, judge: and whether they are agreeable to common sense, let
every one judge, that has human understanding in exercise.
And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that Virtue and Vice are wholly excluded
out of the world; and that there never was, nor ever can be, any such thing as one or the
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SECTION VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue,…