Another objection (that perhaps may be thought hardly worth mentioning) is, that to
suppose sin to be infinitely heinous, is to make all sins equally heinous; for how can any sin
be more than infinitely heinous? But all that can be argued hence is, that no sin can be
greater with respect to that aggravation, the worthiness of the object against whom it is
committed. One sin cannot be more aggravated than another in that respect, because the
aggravation of every sin is infinite; but that does not hinder, that some sins may be more
heinous than others in other respects: as if we should suppose a cylinder infinitely long, it
cannot be greater in that respect, viz. with respect to the length of it; but yet it may be doubled
and trebled, and made a thousand-fold more, by the increase of other dimensions. Of sins
that are all infinitely heinous, some may be more heinous than others; as well as of divers
punishments that are all infinitely dreadful calamities, so that there is no finite calamity,
however great, but what is infinitely less dreadful, or more eligible, than any of them, yet
some of them may be a thousand times more dreadful than others. A punishment may be
infinitely dreadful by reason of the infinite duration of it; and therefore cannot be greater
with respect to that aggravation of it, viz. its length of continuance, but yet may be vastly
more terrible on other accounts.
Having thus, as I imagine, made it clear, that all sin is infinitely heinous, and consequently
that the sinner, before he is justified, is under infinite guilt in God’s sight; it now remains
that I show the consequences, or how it follows from hence, that it is not suitable that God
should give the sinner an interest in Christ’s merits, and so a title to his benefits, from regard
to any qualifications, or act, or course of acts in him, on the account of any excellency or
goodness whatsoever therein, but only as uniting to Christ; or (which fully implies it) that
it is not suitable that God, by any act, should, in any manner or degree, testify any acceptance
of, or pleasedness with, any thing, as any virtue, or excellency, or any part of loveliness, or
valuableness in his person, until he is actually already interested in Christ’s merits. From
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the premises it follows, that before the sinner is already interested in Christ, and justified,
it is impossible God should have any acceptance of or pleasedness with the person of the
sinner, as in any degree lovely in his sight, or indeed less the object of his displeasure and
wrath. For, by the supposition, the sinner still remains infinitely guilty in the sight of God;
for guilt is not removed but by pardon: but to suppose the sinner already pardoned, is to
suppose him already justified; which is contrary to the supposition. But if the sinner still
remains infinitely guilty in God’s sight, that is the same thing as still to be beheld of God as
infinitely the object of his displeasure and wrath, or infinitely hateful in his eyes; and if so,
where is any room for any thing in him, to be accepted as some valuableness or acceptableness
of him in God’s sight, or for any act of favour of any kind towards him, or any gift whatsoever
to him, in testimony of God’s respect to an acceptance of something of him lovely and
pleasing? If we should suppose that a sinner could have faith, or some other grace in his
heart, and yet remain separate from Christ; and that he is not looked upon as being in Christ,
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DISCOURSE. II. Pressing into the Kingdom of God.