3. Either after or before this, to have a dissertation concerning the exceeding vanity,
blindness, and weakness of the mind of man.—What poor fallible creatures men are. How
every man is insensible of his own; thinks himself best.—Concerning the Pride of men; how
ready to think they shall be great men, and to promise themselves great things.
4. How some men have Strong Reason, but not Good Judgment.
5. Concerning Certainty and Assurance. How many things that are demonstrations in
themselves, are not demonstrations to men, and yet are strong arguments; no more
demonstrations than a boy may have, that a cube of two inches may be cut into eight cubes
of one inch, for want of proper clearness, and full comprehension of the ideas. How assurance
is capable of infinite degrees.—How none have such a degree, but that it might be
heightened—even of that, that two and two make four. It may be increased by a stronger
sight, or a greater clearness of ideas. Minds of clearer and stronger sight may be more assured
of it, than those of more obscure vision. There may be beings of a thousand times stronger
sight than we are. How God’s sight only is infinitely clear and strong. That which is
demonstration at one time, may be only probable reasoning at another, by reason of different
degrees of clearness and comprehension. It is almost impossible, that a long demonstration
should beget so great assurance as a short one; because many ideas cannot be so clearly
comprehended at one time, as a few. A very long demonstration may beget assurance, by a
particular examination of each link of the chain, and so by recollection, that we were very
careful and assured in the time of it; but this is less immediate, and less clear.
6. Why it is proper for Orators and Preachers to move the Passions—needful to show
earnestness, &c. how this tends to convince the judgment, and many other ways is good
and absolutely necessary.
7. Of the nature of the Affections or Passions—how only strong and lively exercises of
the Will, together with the effect on the Animal nature.
8. In treating oh Human Nature, treat first of Being in general, and show what in Human
Nature, necessarily existing from the nature of Entity. And then, concerning Perceiving or
Intelligent Beings, in particular, and show what arises from the nature of such. And then
Animal Nature, and what from that.
9. Concerning Enthusiasm, Inspiration, Grace, &c.
10. Concerning a two-fold ground of Assurance of the Judgment—a reducing things to
an Identity or Contradiction, as in Mathematical demonstrations,—and by a natural, invin-
cible inclination to a connexion, as when we see any Effect to conclude a Cause—an oppos-
ition to believe a thing can begin without a Cause. This is not the same with the other, and
cannot be reduced to a contradiction.
11. Difference between Natural Appetites and Rational Desires.
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NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.